Monday 23 July 2018

We need to stop accepting excuses from the goverment and have reassurance. Say NO to Delays, never-ending aims, no accountability,excuses and pilots projects with no set date or time limits, now yet more delays!

IPP prisoners Over tariff should not endure further years with no Hope and further delays.

We need a policy change and we need it now. No one should hope they get justice, know one should live another day unable to “face life in a violent, drug ridden prison.

Drugs have no place in prisons
It is Inexcusable to have drug ridden and violent prisons and such a high suicides. How can this be allowed to continue? How can you accuse the deaths we will do better when better never come's.

The government have a duty of care to protect inmates in a reasonable time from harm regardless of whether inmates take appropriate measures themselves.

But the prisons answer for to the problem is a desire to put the vulnerable victims into segregation for their own safety. This is not an adequate solution under the duty of care, if your REPEATED victim of your environment as victims are often target repeatedly. This can only effect your mental health and lead to deterioration and risk of self-injury or suicide. Prisoner cant just up and leave so easy its reported now more than ever move to another prison is incredibly difficult for many.

The Media have been reporting the issues with drugs and violence for years and the government do what they do best ignore it, is it poor leadership on a large scale. ..

Families are being targeted for cash by gangs to keep there loved ones safe in prison also they are being targeted pay of any debts. 6% now perhaps that figures has gone up acquire there addiction once they are in prison, so more come out with an addiction than went in with one."Gangs are targeting family homes and threatening them with their life's, these families are members of the public the parole board job is to keep safe from risk.

One mother from the campaign group spoke to BBC radio this week so desperate because she was receiving no help or support " her letters to government bodies went unanswered.

Do you question why the MOJ and the Parole board never acted in a timely manor with regards to IPP the drugs and violence. With IPP prisoners the answer was a simple one a policy change? Four minsters hampered problem and never finished the task set out a job they was employed to do and the impact has been at human cost. The answer to crises is not to shuffle justice minsters we must question who is right for the role in the first place.

We need Ministers that is committed to giving an end solution to a longstanding problem, so he can deal with the next problem.

Negligence OR poor performance. There should be an investigation in to the shifting of minsters who's role it is has been to do a job which is has serious implications to finish job and the aims they set out. what is needed is more transparent around this area!

If we look at the drug problem in the articles below no one is accountable there still is a drug problem who is for acting for the prisons in a timely manor to reduce the such deaths ?

Is it Gross incompetence those employed to for performance, but have no an inability to do finish at a satisfactory standard or to complete tasks on time or given date, then the employee is considered competent.

How long addressing drug problem ? And it got worse.

The Guardian 2018https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/may/16/prisons-inspector-condemns-appalling-suicide-rate-at-nottingham-jail
2016 - Drug use in prison is seen as a coping mechanism that helps

The Guardian 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/jul/09/drugs-mobile-phones-found-in-uk-prisons-contraband

Cracked 2014 http://www.cracked.com/personal-experiences-1452-5-things-i-learned-smuggling-drugs-into-jail-under-my-junk.html

BBC 2015 drugs in prison http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/31871602/how-drugs-get-into-prisons-in-england-and-wales

BBC 2010 prison hell drug trafficker warns https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11450202

The Guardian 2008 -2013
6% acquire that addiction once they are in prison,https://fullfact.org/crime/how-many-prisoners-are-drug-addicts/
RTC 2008 drug and phones https://www.rte.ie/news/2008/0801/106495-gilliganj/
Guardian 2007 bribes ,drugs and staff in fear of life
keeping drugs out of prison

What is the purpose MOJ and have they done there job?

The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) is a Government , headed by the Minister of Justice.It is mandated to :

To provide and Improved access to justice
Efficient and fair system of justice for al
Uphold people’s civil liberties
Increase confidence in the justice system and Strengthened linkss between institutions.
Providing means of redress when people are abused by organs of the state.
Protection.strengthened public trust and confidence in the justice system.

The priority policy

"Comprehensive transformation of the justice system, focusing primarily in the short to medium terms on the following policy areas:

Justice Reform
Restorative Justice
Protecting Vulnerable Groups

Quote: Peter Clarke

January , the Chief Inspector of Prisons, Peter Clarke, was so disturbed by what he found during an inspection of HMP prison that he made it the first referral to the Justice Secretary under the new ‘Urgent Notification Protocol’. Now the actual report, described as “one of the most disturbing reports in recent years” has been published and Mr Clarke asks if some of the apparently self-inflicted deaths were caused by prisoners unable to “face life in the violent, drug ridden prison”.

There is “unfairness” and “unnecessary prolonged incarceration” considerable uncertainty" Chief Prison Inspector's Annual Report pulls no punches on the state of prisons in England and Wales.

Not even basic standards of safety and decency. In the year 2017–18 prison inspectors documented some of the most disturbing jail conditions they had ever seen, according to Peter Clarke.

Launching his third annual report (published 11 July 2018), Mr Clarke said these conditions had no place in the prison system in an advanced nation in the 21st century.

In 2011–15 the Ministry outlined there aim, but did it happen.

1. Introduce a "rehabilitation revolution"

Create a system introducing greater involvement of the private and voluntary sectors in the rehabilitation of offenders, including use of payment by results, to cut reoffending

2. Reform sentencing and penalties

Ensure that the justice system reduces reoffending by introducing more effective sentencing policies and considering the use of restorative justice for adult and youth crimes

3. Reform courts, tribunals and legal aid, and work with others to reform delivery of criminal justice

Reform the legal aid system to make it work more efficiently, while ensuring that we provide necessary support for those who need it most and for those cases that require it.
Develop court reforms to improve the resolution of disputes, maximise efficiency and improve services and work with others to make delivery of criminal justice more effective and efficient

4. Assure "better law"

Assure that law-making is transparent and accountable, safeguarding civil liberties and enabling citizens to receive the proper protection of the law

5. Reform how the ministry delivers its services

Reform the way the Ministry of Justice works. Reassess its ways of working to develop more efficient shared services, match its provision "ever more closely" to demand, reduce duplication and streamline its functions wherever possible.The departmental board has overall responsibility for delivery of the structural reform plan. Chaired by the Secretary of State and its membership includes the ministerial team, the Permanent Secretary, the Director General of Finance, the Director General of "Transforming Justice" and departmental non-executive board members But what happens when they don't???

Recall research was carried out by the Cambridge faulty of law in 2013. Has their been lesson learned and so did the government act??

In fact it got worse. Delays, never-ending aims, no accountability, excuses and pilot projects with no set dates or time limits and yet more delays.There had been plenty of word playing over the century’s and more recently we have had no less than 4 Government Ministers that we all pleaded with for a policy change, which never came and we still have the same issues!!

A considerable length of time has past since and we are at another stage at present with pilot schemes now under way but how long now till we get a date for these to work? They have not yet rolled them out across the prison estate so how long is the trial and error given before we see a roll out?

Currently it all seems to show that the government want to be seen to be doing something but nothing appears to be happening quickly.

Nothing is ever done in a timely manner and this is very concerning, we need to ask the government to step up to the mark and give us dates. We were given a date of 2020 but I'm concerned now since the resignation of the head of the parole board (Nick Hardwick) that this date will elapse especially due to the extra scrutiny that the Parole Board are now under. The Parole Board are once again stating delays, perhaps blaming Warboy's when the problem was already there and prisoners had brought the issues up two years ago in their campaign letters. We didn’t have to wait for Warboy's to show the failings in the system. Its simply not fit for purpose and needs urgent action.

Research carried out by UniversityCambridge.

Nicola Padfield University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2/2013

The two specific research questions were - Are the reasons for recall clearly understood (both by prisoners and those who work in the criminal justice system)?

Dates at the time

- What can be done to reduce the number of prisoners recalled to prison Forty-six prisoners (36 men and 10 women) were interviewed in two local prisons about their experience of being recalled to prison. These prisoners were serving a wide variety of sentences, from life (3), extended sentences (9), to less than 2 years (10). At the same time, a wider ‘snap-shot’ of recall was obtained by a review of 129 prisoners’ files, and context setting interviews were held with a number of probation and NOMS staff.

In interview, several prisoners felt that they had been ‘set up to fail’
by unreasonable licence conditions, which had been inadequately discussed with them. Their relationship with their probation officers2 varied, and several showed real sympathy with their probation officers for the difficult decisions they had to make.

However, many felt ‘let down’ by probation officers.
They told powerful stories about the difficulties of building law-abiding lives when on licence. Some accepted why they had been recalled, but could not understand why it was taking so long for them to be re-released. Most seemed to think that their probation officer had far too much power, and many argued for a more judicialised process.

Thirty-three of the 46 prisoners (including the 7 fixed term recalls) interviewed had been recalled for allegations of fresh offences. For some this was a ‘fair cop’, but many strenuously denied the offences, some suggesting that they had been ‘stitched–up’

Several were not subsequently charged, or the charges were later dropped. Others were acquitted at court.

None of these prisoners could understand why they remained in prison as recalled offenders.

Even those who had pleaded guilty, or intended to do so, were angry at some of the perceived injustices of the process: for example, the fact they did not have remand prisoner status, or the period spent on recall after a short fresh sentence had been completed.

Thirteen of the 46 had been recalled for breaching conditions of their licence, not for allegations of further offending.

These failures’ included being expelled from Approved Premises, failing to demonstrate motivation to deal with drug addiction, associating with known offenders, using a computer, and not making contact or losing contact with their probation officers.

All prisoners had received a ‘recall pack’ or ‘recall dossier’ after they had been returned to prison. For many, this was too complicated, and many were irritated by the negative and outdated account of them given in the dossier, and by the reliance on risk predictors, which seemed impossible to challenge.

“The overwhelming impression given by the prisoners was that they had little knowledge or understanding of what was being done to progress their case. The invisibility of those empowered to make the decision to release them, and the uncertainty which surrounds the release process were both enormously debilitating.

Parole Board panels 1 Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Cambridge; Fellow of Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge; Crown Court Recorder. 2 I have chosen to use the term ‘probation officer’ rather than ‘offender manager’ since it is most commonly employed in practice.
“”were perceived as part of a distant bureaucracy “which takes unreasonable and uncertain time” to reach decisions.

The different roles of the Ministry of Justice’s PPU and the Parole Board were not understood.

Prisoners felt that they were not given reliable information. Prison staff were seen as uninformed, or at worst, deliberately unhelpful.
There was widespread misunderstanding of the process: for example, the criteria for the somewhat rare ‘fixed term’ recall; or whether a ‘standard’ recall is for a fixed or indefinite term. Even those who understood the process were deeply frustrated by it.
Many of the offenders interviewed in this study did not appear to need to be in prison for public protection, certainly not in the sense of being a vivid ‘danger’ to society.

Whilst there was a risk of them re-offending, for many this risk seemed to be exacerbated, rather than reduced, by some licence conditions and particularly by further imprisonment.
Possible policy implications: - Sentence management: ‘beginning to end’ sentence management should include the transition of offenders from prison to the community (and, if necessary and appropriate, back to prison).

There needs to be a review of the way prisoners progress from prison to the community, for example, via Approved Premises. Probation officers should actively supervise ‘their’ offenders who are in custody. Their role as both licence enforcer and sympathetic supporter of released offenders needs review. - The role of the courts in the management of offenders. The law and practice on bail and recall, in the light of what is clearly inconsistent current practice, needs review.

Priority should also be given to the codification of sentencing law, to include the law on release and recall, including the powers and practice of the Parole Board (a review should consider whether sentence review courts would work better to encourage offenders to earn their way out of prison and off supervision, and also to encourage NOMS to provide swift, well prepared support packages).

- Human rights and fairness issues.

Prisoners should be provided with better general advice on recall (leaflets, video etc), as well as with better individual advice (oral practical advice on the wings, as well as confidential legal advice, perhaps by way of ‘champions’ on the wings); they should receive reliable and regular updates on the progress of their applications for re-release.

Future research should explore: - the perceptions of recall by other criminal justice professionals and participants, including other offenders, and not only those currently in prison. - the ways different sentences are implemented in practice (exploring, for example, the realities of serving an extended sentence, as well as life and IPP sentences).

- the current use of recall, including the different forms of recall, the use of non disclosed ‘intelligence’, and other ‘sanctions’ apart from recall. - whether there are better ways to stimulate good behaviour, to increase individual motivation, and to prepare prisoners prior to release. - the role of the probation officer, in the light of the development of MAPPA, PPO schemes, and the changing role of the police in the supervision of offenders. - comparative research (particularly in European jurisdictions) on both the law and practice in this area.

Many of the prisoners in this study felt they had had little support whilst on licence.

Back in prison, they could pass weeks, or months, wondering what was happening to their ‘case’. Prisoners described a level of support in prison which often seemed almost non-existent. This could appear inhumane, unfair and counter-productive.

It was also a wasted opportunity. What this small study would suggest is that, if the ‘system’ of recall is to be perceived as fair and legitimate, prisoners deserve more information, more advice, more certainty and much less delay.

3 Contents: Acknowledgements
Introduction - The legal framework - Decision to release and licence conditions - Recall - Review of relevant academic literature Methods - Aims - Design - File analysis - Interviews - Limitations of the study
Findings - Profile of interviewees - Sentence calculation and licence conditions - Relationship with probation officers - The challenges of living a licence - The type and timing of recall - The recall pack or dossier - The re-release process - The role of the Parole Board and PPU - The role of MAPPA –

Emotional responses to recall: from anger to despair
Discussion - Complexity and confusion - Before recall - Recall itself - Serving a period of recall - The Parole Board - Predicting the risk of re-offending - Levels of inconsistency in sentencing - The importance of media and political responsibility

Conclusions and Recommendations
4 Acknowledgements
This research took place during a short period of sabbatical leave. I am of course grateful to colleagues who allowed me to take that leave, and to the National Offender Management Service of the Ministry of Justice who permitted the research. In particular, I should like to thank - The staff in the two prisons where the fieldwork was carried out.

Although I have anonymised the prisons in the study, in order to keep the emphasis on prisoners’ perceptions of the recall process, and not on the individual prisons involved, I should say that the staff in both prisons tolerated our research presence much more patiently than I could have hoped.

Particularly those doing administrative tasks in the prisons: paper files and computerised records were often difficult to match up and in both prisons it was sometimes difficult for me to identify core information.

The willingness of staff to go out of their way to help was remarkable. And without the support of their management team, the project would have been impossible.

The prisoners, who were, perhaps unsurprisingly, keen to speak with us. Many were keen to tell us other people’s stories as well as their own. Many perceived very significant problems with the recall process and were often articulate in explaining not only their personal experiences, but also ways in which the process could or should be improved.
I am very grateful to them, and feel a burden of responsibility to try and get their opinions heard and understood.

- Dr Christopher Padfield who helped set up the project and who carried out 20 of the 46 interviews, as well as contributing in many other ways.
- The probation staff in two areas who generously gave up their time to discuss my tentative findings at an early stage in the analysis.

- The Advisory Board (Dr Ben Crewe, Professor Loraine Gelsthorpe, Professor Alison Liebling, all of the Institute of Criminology at the University of Cambridge, and Giles McCathie, NOMS East of England Lead Psychologist), whose wise counsel helped me develop the project efficiently and, I hope, usefully.

- The Newton Trust for a small grant which covered the travel expenses incurred in carrying out this research project.

5 Introduction
In England and Wales, most prisoners are released from prison conditionally at the halfway point in their sentence (or sooner), but a large number end up being recalled to prison during this second part of the sentence. Of those recalled, many do not achieve re-release before the end of the sentence, losing thereby the opportunity to restart their lives with some sort of supervision in the community.

Dates then

In 2009-10, a total of 13,900 determinate sentenced offenders were recalled to custody, up 18 per cent from 2008-09 (11,800). The number of people on life licence who were recalled to custody increased from 108 in 2008 to 124 in 2009. During the quarter ending March 2011, 3,821 offenders had their licence revoked and were recalled (Offender Management Statistics, Quarterly Bulletin).

These additional prisoners add a huge cost to the criminal justice system. Yet little work has been done to understand the effect or utility of the recall process. This small project sought to understand the experience of recall, and to propose solutions to some of the problems raised.

The legal framework
Sentencing law is complex and subject to frequent change. The initial sentencing framework is largely to be found in statutes, interpreted and developed in decisions of the Court of Appeal and guidelines from the Sentencing Council (the successor to the Sentencing Guidelines Council). The law on release and recall is built on these complex foundations, and developed in yet more complex statutory provisions, interpreted and developed in court decisions, as well as guided in practice by an array of Prison Service Instructions, Probation Instructions and Circulars, NOMS Agency Instructions, Secretary of State’s Directions and so on3.

Offenders are still being released under laws passed in the Criminal Justice Act 1991, the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (s. 145). New changes will brought about in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill, currently before Parliament.

There is a clear case for simplification and codification.
Decision to release and licence conditions Early release has been a part of the English sentencing system for very many years. The basic aims are clear: 3 In practice, the key documents for probation officers are: PC13/2003: Sharing Information to inform decisions on offender release and recall (which is marked ‘expires Mar 2009’, but regardless of expiry dates, instructions remain in force until specifically cancelled, marked obsolete or replaced and removed from the intranet.

Unhelpfully many are not available on the internet); PC42/2003: Parole, Licence and Recall Arrangements (with an expiry date of July 2008: this PC was replaced by PC 16/2005); PC45B/2004 Parole Board: Oral hearings of offenders’ representations against recall (expires July 2009 (or until replaced)); PC03/2005: Supervision, revocation and recall for prisoners released on licence (expiry June 2009); PC 76/2005: Oral hearings – further guidance (ex p Sept 2010 or until replaced); PC 26/2007: Disclosure and Information sharing to inform PB decisions on release and recall (exp July 2010); PC 14/2008 – Post release enforcement – recall and further release (exp July 2013); PI 13/2010 – Licence conditions; PI 07/11 – Licence conditions (issued on 21 April 2011). As well there are several relevant Prison Service Orders: PSO 6000 (Parole, Release and Recall manual) and PSO 4700 (which until recently was knows as the Lifer Manual, but is now called the Indeterminate Sentence Manual). There are several relevant PSIs: PSI 48/2007 on Recall and release of determinate sentence prisoners; PSI 34/2011 on Licence conditions.

6 The aims of the period served on licence in the community are to protect the public, to prevent reoffending and to secure the successful re-integration of the offender into the community. Licence conditions should be preventative as opposed to punitive and must be proportionate, reasonable and necessary. How they are to be monitored and enforced must be evident (para 1.2, PI 07/11).
Yet law and practice mask this basic simplicity. Offenders interviewed in this study had been released under a variety of early release schemes:

- by the Parole Board: this was the case for the life sentence prisoners, the prisoners serving ‘old style’ extended sentences and the occasional ‘Discretionary Conditional Release’ prisoner
- straight from court: one from the Court of Appeal, one from the Crown Court
- by the decision of a prison Governor (or Controller of a privately run prison) to grant Home Detention Curfew
- automatically at their ‘non-parole’ date for DCR prisoners or at half time for most determinate sentence prisoners.

All were released subject to many conditions. There are six standard licence conditions:
i) To keep in touch with your supervising officer in accordance with any instruction you may be given;
ii) If required, to receive visits from your supervising officer at your home/place of residence (e.g. an Approved Premises)
iii) Permanently to reside at an address approved by your supervising officer and notify him/her in advance of any proposed change to address or any proposed stay (even for one night) away from that approved address;
iv) Undertake only such work (including voluntary work) approved by your supervising officer and notify him or her in advance of any proposed change;
v) Not to travel outside the United Kingdom unless otherwise directed by your supervising officer (permission for which will be given in exceptional circumstances only) or for the purpose of complying with immigration/deportation;

vi) To be well behaved, not to commit any offence and not to do anything which could undermine the purpose of your supervision, which is to protect the public, prevent you from re-offending and help you to re-settle successfully into the community.

Many licences reviewed in this study contained variations in wording, or indeed typing errors. Licences usually contained additional conditions. A menu of additional conditions is at Annex A of PSI 34/2011.
Common examples are:
(a) a requirement that he/she reside at a certain place;
(b) a requirement relating to his/her making or maintaining contact with a person;
(c) a restriction relating to his/her making or maintaining contact with a person;
(d) a restriction on his/her participation in, or undertaking of, an activity;
(e) a requirement that he/she participate in, or co-operate with, a programme or set of activities designed to further one or more of the purposes referred to in section 250(8) of the 2003 Act; (f) a requirement that he/she comply with a curfew arrangement; (g) a restriction on his/her freedom of movement (which is not a requirement referred to in sub-paragraph (f));
7 (h) a requirement relating to his/her supervision in the community by a responsible officer.
As we shall see, in reality, licence conditions can be somewhat muddled and/or confusing.

Recall
Since the changes introduced by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, there have been three kinds of recall:

(i) Fixed term recall

This is recall for a fixed period of 28 days. Offenders are eligible for this unless:

• They are serving life or IPP (imprisonment for public protection), or an extended sentence; or

• They are serving a sentence imposed for any sexual or violent crime listed in Schedule 15 of the CJA 2003 (a list of 153 offences); or

• They have been recalled before their automatic release date after being released early on Home Detention Curfew or compassionate grounds; or

• They have been previously recalled, on the same sentence.

(ii) Standard recall

This results in an offender remaining in prison until the end of their sentence, unless either the Secretary of State (in practice the Public Protection Unit of the Ministry of Justice) or the Parole Board orders their release. They may only order re-release if, but only if, they are satisfied that imprisonment is no longer necessary for the protection of the public.

(iii) Emergency recall

This is identical to the standard recall except that the offender has been identified as a risk of serious harm and/or that the risk of re-offending is unmanageable or imminent. There were no emergency recalls in this study, and so the focus is on fixed term (FT) recalls, and standard recalls. Recall is initiated by a probation officer4.

They complete a Request for Recall Report (Annex E to PC 14/2008, which also contains guidance on how the report should be completed).

The form is lengthy (seven pages even before any information has been entered into it), with sections on - Recommendation: fixed term or standard recall - Probation details - Police details - Offender details - Sentence details - The circumstances and details of the breach - Victim issues (see also PC 27/2007 on victims representation at Parole Board hearings) - Risk assessment (including review of OASys at time of recall, Risk of serious harm level, Risk of Reconviction Assessment (OGP), Violence Predictor (OVP), Offender Group Reconviction scale (OGRS3))

4 Official discourse sometimes uses the term ‘probation officer’, sometimes ‘offender manager’, or ‘offender supervisor’. I have chosen to use the term ‘probation officer’ since it is most commonly employed in practice.

8 Once completed, this form is endorsed by the officer’s line manager, and authorized by a senior manager and sent to the Public Protection Casework section within the NOMS Public Protection Unit (PPU) of the Ministry of Justice. The probation officer must also attach to this form a wide variety of other documents:

OAsys R6.1; OASys R6.2; OASys R10; Asset Core Profile; Asset Risk of Serious Harm; the Pre-sentence report; the list of previous convictions; a copy of the licence (and details of and reasons for any conditions added post-release); charge sheets/police evidence (where relevant if recall relates to new offence); Indeterminate Progress report(s); Sentence Plan (for cases where there is a low ROH and where OASys does not require a full RMP to be drawn up).

These documents make up the ‘parole dossier’ or ‘parole pack’ which will be disclosed to the prisoner (though some sensitive information may not be disclosed: see Probation Circular 26/2007). When prisoners are given the pack, there is a cover sheet that they must complete asking whether or not they wish to make representations against recall, and if so, the name of their solicitor.

(This form does not make it clear that the onus is on the prisoner to contact the solicitor themselves).

A copy of this form is sent by the prison to the casework teams in PPU, who then consider all cases. PPU are responsible for the re-release of fixed term (FT) recalled offenders, and may also re-release Standard Recall (SR) offenders. They refer all extended and life sentence cases on to the Parole Board for review, as well as all SR offenders who have not been re-released by day 28 of their return to custody. At this stage the probation officer/offender manager should have completed a further report, the Review for Re-release (to be found at Annex H of PC 14/2008).
This includes a review of the assessments, a risk management plan and a clear recommendation for or against release.

When the dossier is sent on to the Parole Board, a one member ‘panel’ of the Parole Board then reviews the cases of those SR offenders who haven’t been re-released within 28 days, at a paper hearing (i.e. it is a review of documents only, with perhaps 20 cases being considered in a day).

The prisoner is not informed of the date of this review, and learns the outcome some days later by way of a letter from PPU, who send on the ‘panel’s’ decision. If the Parole Board makes no recommendation as to release, which in this study was invariably the case, the prisoner is told of their right to appeal or to ask for an oral hearing. Interestingly, it appears very rare that the Board will have received any representations by this stage: in this study, even though many of the prisoners had signed a form to say that they wished to make representations, the decision letter from the Board invariably stated that no representations had been received.

This is not the place for a full review of the status and powers of the Parole Board. Suffice to say, that it is an executive non-departmental public body, and has been held by the Court of Appeal not to be a truly independent court or tribunal, for the purposes of the European Convention on Human Rights (see Padfield, 2009b, 2011c). The Secretary of State continues to give the Board directions on what matters are to be taken into account in discharging its functions. In giving any such directions, the Secretary of State must have regard to
(a) the need to protect the public from serious harm from offenders, and
9 (b) the desirability of preventing the commission by them of further offences and of securing their rehabilitation (s. 239(6) CJA 2003).
The Directions issued in December 2009 specify that In reviewing the offender’s continued detention, the Parole Board may:

• recommend the offenders immediate release on licence;

• fix a date for the offender’s future release on licence, within a year of the Board's decision; or

• determine the reference by making no recommendation as to the offenders release. The Board is required to take into account all the information available at the time the recall decision was taken, together with any subsequent information, including representations made by or on behalf of the offender. In particular, the Parole Board should consider: (a) Current assessments of risk prepared by prison and probation staff. 

(b) Whether the risk management plan, prepared by the Probation Service is adequate to manage effectively any potential risk of serious harm or of imminent re-offending.

(c) Whether, in light of the offenders previous response to supervision, the offender is likely to comply in future with the requirements of probation supervision for the duration of the licence period.

(d) The availability of suitable accommodation, as well as the availability and timing of offending behaviour work or any other intervention, either in or out of custody.

(e) The date on which the outcome of any pending prosecution will be known.

(f) Whether the interests of public protection and the prisoners long term rehabilitation would be better served if the offender were re-released whilst subject to probation supervision.   

(g) Any representations on behalf of the victim in respect of licence conditions. Each individual case should be considered on its own merits, without any discrimination on any grounds.
When there is no recommendation for release, the case must be referred back to the Parole Board at “yearly intervals by the Secretary of State (in practice, the PPU): s. 256A CJA 2003.

Lifers are automatically granted an oral hearing, and in other cases, where a prisoner is making representations against recall and disputes the facts, they may apply for an oral hearing.

Applications for an oral hearing are sometimes granted (see discussion below, at page 41). Oral hearings come in a variety of formats: within this study there were three member oral hearings chaired by a judge, three member hearings chaired by an independent member, two person oral hearings; and single member oral hearings (including two via video link from the small female chapel in Prison B).

Only oral hearings concerning life sentence prisoners currently have to be chaired by a judge.
Once those released on Home Detention Curfew (HDC) have been recalled for breach of licence conditions, the Parole Board is not empowered to recommend their release until they reach their conditional release date: even the Parole Board cannot order rerelease before half-time.

Where the Parole Board makes ‘no recommendation’, the prisoner is likely to stay in until their Sentence Expiry Date. On the other hand, those who are recalled simply for breaching their HDC conditions are re-released automatically at half time.

10 Review of relevant academic literature
A research study such as this is built on much previous research: see the bibliography for publications which appear to be particularly relevant. It is perhaps surprising how little empirical work has focused on the recall process in this country (see Padfield and Maruna, 2006, Collins, 2007). The Prison Reform Trust (2005) called the increase over the previous five years in the number of adult offenders recalled to custody ‘startling’, and since then, the increase has accelerated (see NOMS annual statistics). An unusual and perceptive small study is Digard (2010).

Having interviewed 20 recalled sex offenders, he found offender views of the system focused almost exclusively on the procedural fairness of the process. He concluded that disregard for procedural fairness may decrease offender’s levels of mental well- being, engagement in their management, motivation to forge new lives, and respect for authorities and the civic values they represent. It may inhibit the maintenance of an effective probation/client relationship and increase resistance.
Much of the parole and recall research has been carried out in the very different penal context of the USA (e.g. Petersilia, 2003, Travis and Lawrence, 2002) and in Canada (e.g. Turnbull and Hannah-Moffat, 2009). A comparative European literature on law and practice is only starting to emerge (see Padfield, van Zyl Smit and Dunkel, 2010).

Also relevant is/are - the literature on desistance from crime and on what works to reduce re-offending. This is linked to research on resettlement, or as it is known in the US, ‘prisoner reentry’. It is widely accepted that it is very difficult to maintain a decision to abandon crime, and that for probation supervision to ‘work’, offenders must feel engaged and committed to the supervisory process. They face huge hurdles and what often feel like endless setbacks in their attempts to go ‘straight’ (see, for example, Maruna, 2001).

- the literature on the ‘pains of imprisonment’ (see Crewe, 2011).
- studies of probation practice, which frequently stress the vital importance for offenders of trusting relationships with probation officers who understand and support them.

As Wood and Kemshall (2007) explain, offenders displayed a greater readiness to comply when they felt that the restrictions imposed upon them were clearly explained by supervision staff, and were reasonable in relation to their offending behaviour.

Those offenders who felt a strong reluctance to comply tended to report a lack of understanding about the reasons for the restrictions imposed (at page 14). Rex found that probation officers who showed empathy, respect, a sense of commitment, ‘support and encouragement’ and offered useful advice were more likely than others to produce normative compliance in the form of a ‘sense of obligation’ and ‘feelings of personal loyalty towards supervisors and accountability for actions’.

She points out ‘that probation officers have to make considerable efforts to ensure that probationers play a sufficiently prominent role in defining what their problems are, and in identifying where their solutions lie’ (Rex, 1999, at page 380). More recently, Maguire and Raynor (2006) paint a somewhat depressing picture of ‘the potential fragmentation of the system, together with poor staff morale in the face of contestability, confusion over officers’ roles and a continuing focus on organizational change rather than the necessary staff skills development’ which they

11conclude make the generalized establishment of close supportive relationships an unlikely prospect in the near future at least.

- the wider literature on justice, fair treatment and legitimacy, which shows that the perceived legitimacy of authority can trigger normative compliance (Bottoms, 2001; Tyler, 1990, 2010; Paternoster et al, 1997). As Ugwudike (2011) puts it: An individualised enforcement approach that takes into account the adverse social conditions that affect many probationers and the concern to maintain good working relationships are strategies that are more likely to evoke feelings of fair treatment and encourage compliance (at page 254).

It is also important to recognize that measuring ‘success’ is very difficult. Reoffending or recidivism rates are blunt measures. For example, it is unsurprising that studies show little evidence that different release regimes have any impact on future offending. Thus, Marie, Moreton and Goncalves (2011) in a large study found offenders who received HDC were no more likely to engage in criminal behaviour when released from prison when compared to offenders with similar characteristics who were not eligible for early release on HDC.

This was the case, even when controlling for the additional time that offenders on HDC are in the community, due to being released early. Predicting who will re-offend is particularly difficult: for example, Craissati and Sindall (2009) examined 94 serious further offences committed by offenders managed by the London Probation Area in 2004-2006. They found no clear identifying features of these offenders to differentiate them from a much wider sample of the probation caseload.

There were some key situational contexts which were associated with serious harm to others (rather than simply likelihood of re-offending) such as pervasive weapon use, unexpected victim responses during acquisitive crimes, and disputes occurring within an anti-social male subculture. Similarly in this study, much of the offending by those interviewed was clearly not predicted by their probation officers. The literature on risk assessment tools is briefly reviewed in Padfield (2011a).

12 Methods Aims
The primary aim was to increase understanding of the recall process. The two specific research questions were

Are the reasons for recall clearly understood (both by prisoners and those who work in the criminal justice system)?
-What can be done to reduce the number of prisoners recalled to prison?
Design

This research was small-scale in nature. Fieldwork was carried out in two local prisons (one holding only male prisoners, and in the public sector, here described as Prison A; the other holding both men and women, and run by a private company, Prison B) in May and June 2011. In Prison A, 41 prisoners were identified as being under recall. All their paper files were examined, and a sample of

23 of them were interviewed. In Prison B, 99 prisoners were identified as having been recalled (65 men and 34 women). 88 files were read, and 23 prisoners were interviewed (13 men and 10 women).
The interviews and file analysis have achieved the aims of the study largely by qualitative analysis, not quantitative. It is not clear whether all recalled offenders in the two prison were actually identified. The computer system in both prisons was somewhat different, and different questions had to be asked to identify fixed term recalls, standard recalls, and lifer recalls. Many recalled prisoners become ‘unconvicted prisoners’ when their fixed term recall expires (this is a source of frustration to prisoners since the ‘system’ does not always recognise their changed status, with its increased privileges). When re-sentenced, some offenders become both ‘recalled’ and ‘sentenced’ prisoners simultaneously. These overlapping categories help explain why the study may well not have ‘captured’ all the recalled prisoners in either prison.

File analysis
The paper files (129) were read and information from each was collected on a form (see Appendix One). The main focus was the ‘recall pack’ or ‘recall dossier’ (see p. 8 above) but other relevant information was noted. Doing the research from prison paper files was somewhat challenging: the paper files of some prisoners, transferred from other prisons, had not yet reached the new prison. Others were enormous. Much (particularly recent) information is kept on the computer records, to which the researcher did not have direct access. Whilst the staff in both prisons were endlessly generous in answering questions, some relevant data was not found. The research was carried out within a tight timetable and little time was spent chasing up missing data.

Interviews
The fieldwork involved two weeks spent in each prison, based in the main administrative office. All identified recalled prisoners were written to on the first day,

13a personalised letter signed by the lead researcher (see Appendix Two), with a reply slip containing a consent form to be returned within 48 hours.

In Prison A, 30 prisoners agreed to be interviewed, 4 prisoners declined, and in Prison B, 42 agreed to be interviewed, none declined, but many more did not respond. The much higher response rate in Prison A was probably due to efficiency on the part of the Wing Officers, more than any actual reluctance in Prison B. When either interviewer was on the wings in either prison, there were plenty of prisoners eager to talk about their experiences, and those of others. (The co-interviewer is the Vice Chair of the Independent Monitoring Board (IMB) in Prison A. This position doubtless facilitated access in the early stages of the project; it did not cause any difficulties).

The interviews were arranged on the wings to suit the convenience of the regime. The interviewees were therefore not selected randomly: a very few were chosen because the staff said we should talk to that individual, a very few were chosen because they made it clear on the reply slip that they explicitly wished to be interviewed.

Others were simply selected by staff from the list of those who had agreed to be interviewed on the basis of their availability. Forty-four of the 46 interviews were digitally audio-recorded: two lifers were being moved out the day after they were interviewed, and although it was a day when the recording equipment had not been brought to the prison, it seemed important to hear their accounts.
The interviews followed a clear structure: the interview schedule is attached as Appendix Three. Each interview lasted between 35 minutes and 70 minutes5. The lead researcher carried out 26 interviews, the co-researcher, 20. All the interviews were transcribed by the lead researcher (each of the recordings listened to more than once) and analysed to identify common themes and concerns.

“Once the fieldwork was over, meetings were held with a number of probation officers in two different areas, including a group discussion, which was recorded.

A discussion was held with officials from the Ministry of Justice, and with two members of the Parole Board, informally. These discussions were useful in terms of increasing understanding of the process, “but were not formally analysed. Similarly, the advice and comments of the Academic Advisory Committee enriched the analysis.

“Nothing in the present study should be taken to be statistically significant. Indeed, it is not clear that the study captured all the recalled prisoners in both prisons.

The largely qualitative nature of this small-scale study means that it cannot provide generalisations about the operation and experience of recall across the country. The perceptions of these prisoners are drawn upon to illustrate how the recall process can feel to those who live it day-by-day. Their views are a challenge to those who seek to reform or improve the process.

5 Except for one interview

Which lasted only 10 minutes: when the interviewee understood that the interviewer was not ‘from the Ministry of Justice’, he quickly explained his particular unhappiness/grievance, and (understandably) chose to end the interview in order to take his opportunity to shower.

14 Findings at the time"

The findings summarised here are based largely on the interviews with 46 prisoners, but also supplemented by reference to the analysis of the129 paper files.
Profile of interviewees

Profile of interviewees
The 46 people interviewed were:
Aged: 19 – 57; the majority being in their 20s (the paper files covered prisoners from the age of 18-78).
Sex: 36 men, 10 women
Sentences:
Sentence type Men Women Total
Life 3 - 3
Extended sentence 8 1 9
Four years or over 8 1 9
Two years but less than 4
10 5 15
One year but less than 2 years
6 2 8
Less than 12 months 1 1 2
Total 36 10 46

Ethnicity: White: 37 (Prison A: 17; Prison B: 20); BME: 9 (Prison A: 6; Prison B: 3) (Women: White: 9; BME:1) Foreign nationals: 4 (three EU, one non-EU) Standard recalls: 39; Fixed term recalls: 7

These figures seem fairly representative of the recall population as a whole, although both women and Fixed Term recalls were deliberately over-represented in the interview sample, simply in order to make sure that their narratives were heard.

Sentence calculation and licence conditions Sentence calculation and licence conditions
All the interviewed prisoners were asked whether calculating their release date was easy, and about the imposition of licence conditions prior to their release. The vast majority felt that calculating the release date was easy. The main problems were for the lifers, all of whom had served a few years more than their tariff before their initial release (2, 4 and 7 years post-tariff for the three lifers interviewed), and were now spending a long time on recall. Others who had had difficulty calculating their release

15 dates were those serving consecutive sentences imposed on different occasions, and those serving extended sentences.

Two of the extended sentence prisoners clearly had not understood how their sentence was calculated (and in one case, it was impossible to understand the way the sentence had been calculated from the material available in the file, and in another case, it appeared as though it might in fact have been calculated wrongly).

Two had been released directly from Court: one from the Court of Appeal when his IPP had been reduced to a fixed term sentence, and the other from the Crown Court when he was sentenced to 12 months, after more than 6 months in custody on remand6.

Whilst most prisoners were satisfied with the way their sentence was calculated, licence conditions were a very different matter.

Many prisoners felt that they had been ‘set up to fail’, an expression which was mostly used in the sense that they felt it was impossible for them not to fail, rather than in the more damning sense that their probation officer actually wanted them to fail, though both interpretations might be explored further.

They greatly resented their lack of input into the conditions. All had the six standard conditions (see p.6 above), and the vast majority had many more:
Number of conditions on an offender’s licence:

No of conditions
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17+ Not recorded7
Prison A 4 2 2 8 8 - - 1 3 2 1 1 8
Prison B 3 6 6 12 6 9 6 4 2 2 1 3 29

It was particularly aggravating to offenders that they often did not learn about the conditions until shortly before their release. For example, two were very angry that they had only learnt shortly before release that they couldn’t go to their mothers’ home. One was therefore released homeless, and was angry that no-one had helped him to find alternative accommodation. He had been told he couldn’t go home a week before release, and said that, had he known three months earlier, he might have been able to do something about it.
It’s crazy not to let me live with my Mum. You should let someone go where the new life is, where the job is, not make them go where the criminals are, where he’ll go out with the criminals and one thing leads to another. “The other had been forced to go to a hostel:

6 This prisoner stressed that the sentencing judge had said more than once ‘time served’ so he did not understand why he should have licence conditions at all.
But he had been given, by G4S, a licence signed by the Controller of Bronzefield (a women’s prison the other side of London!). He was bitter about his treatment, saying that he had checked with probation and was told he did not need to report, but had then been recalled two weeks later for ‘failure to have any contact’ with his probation officer.

7 Sometimes the recall pack was not available in the file (particularly when the prisoner had moved from another prison), sometimes the licence conditions were not attached, and occasionally I may have failed to identify or to record them.
16 My problem is drink, drugs and other offenders: why did they make me go to that hostel? My Mum’s good and I should have gone there. Probation changed their mind two weeks before I was going out and said I couldn’t go to my Mum’s.
The overwhelming impression given was that people who don’t really know you impose your licence conditions. Often prisoners said that the first time they saw their conditions was at the moment of release, when they would sign anything to get out. Some thought prison staff would be prepared to discuss them if asked to do so, others doubted this. Some said that the first time they actually read them was with the probation officer after release. Some had probably never read them: one said this explicitly. Another said (quite wrongly): I didn’t have any conditions really.
Prisoners were clear that many licence conditions were inappropriate and unnecessary. What’s more, there was an immense sense of frustration at the fact that they had no input, and were not consulted. Their sense of powerlessness shone through discussions:
Plans were made for me without anyone telling me. She wasn’t having any of it. She just wanted to be herself. Do what she’s got to do. Do what she thinks is best. But it wasn’t the best thing for me.
“[My probation officer] blocked my path. The person who sets the conditions should actually meet the person to get the feeling for what conditions are going to work.
The condition which was most criticised was residence in an Approved Hostel. These were perceived to be much more difficult to live in than a prison, particularly a Cat C, local or open prison, where ‘doing time’ could be seen to be relatively easy.
Hostels have their own rules (often hourly signing in to begin with, no visiting another resident’s room, no phone or laptop which can take pictures etc). Being in a hostel: they treat you like children, it’s strange.Several could not cope with the rules.
Others resented the fact that compulsory residence in a hostel made it much more difficult not to re-offend. Thus one could not live with his mother as she managed a pub, but he argued (unsuccessfully) that the watchful eye of his mother and part-time employment in the pub were much more likely to set him straight than staying in a hostel.
Mental health requirements could pose a problem: one young woman (aged 19) hugely resented being required to do a year’s worth of group therapy:
There were 24 of them, I was the only teenager, they were all in their 40s, 50s, 60s…. I said several times, I can’t do it, I’m not ready.
Being banned from pubs was considered by one to be really stupid: his drinking was more controlled in a pub than elsewhere.
Another was banned from using Class A drugs and alcohol: why not class B, and why ban something which is illegal anyway?
A rather long-winded condition is used to ban people from using the Internet:

17 - not to use directly or indirectly any computer, data storage device or any other electronic device (including an internet enabled mobile phone) for the purpose of having access to the internet or having access to email, instant messaging or any other online message board/forum or community without the prior approval of your supervising officer. You must allow a responsible officer reasonable access, including technical checks, to establish usage.

One offender got a written warning when he admitted he had asked his mother over the phone to use the internet to find a suitable car insurance for him; he was later recalled on the basis of police intelligence that he was setting up a Facebook profile, which he strongly denied.

The breadth of a no-computer use condition is challenging:

one offender asked if it meant he couldn’t use a ‘hole in the wall’ to get money from his bank account.
Others suggested that their conditions were impossible: I’m not to associate with known sex offenders or children under 8: how am I meant to know?
Or illogical:
they make you report to the same probation office as people you’re not allowed to associate with, whereas there’s another probation office much nearer to the hostel where I was living which would have been much better.
The general condition to be of ‘good behaviour’ irritated several prisoners:
Good behaviour – how do they expect you to come out after 14 years and be of good behaviour? My picture is plastered all over the police station. They drive past, see you talking to a known offender….
Unfortunately, licence conditions are often poorly drafted or typed swiftly. Typing errors occur: repeat or illogical numbers (two number (viii), for example), or missing negatives: ‘you must seek to approach or communicate with X directly or indirectly, or incite others to do so’.
Nor was there any consistent format.
Some were typed into “complex templates, made less understandable when the offender was also on HDC and/or living in Approved Premises or a hostel, and facing two or three different sets of rules.

Relationship with probation officers Unsurprisingly, there were many different narratives: prisoners perceive there to be good probation officers and poor probation officers.

They talk to each other about their officers.
A useful probation officer is one who listens, and one who tries to understand how difficult it is to lead a law-abiding life on leaving prison.
You need better communication on their part – and more compassion.
You need people in probation who’ve had life experience, come out on the other side with their heads high.
You need someone who understands and is not just looking at guidelines and ticking boxes.
Many gave examples of practical help, as well as understanding:
the probation officer who got someone a bus pass,
or a gym membership,
or who helped negotiate with social services to preserve a family relationship. Every little bit of help seemed to be

18 appreciated. But the negative stories were powerful. Several made it clear that, in their eyes, they had been succeeding ‘despite the probation officer’:

I got more help from the JobCentre than I did from probation”.
Some suggested that the probation service should be abolished:
many interviewees found employers, family, the JobCentre or support workers more useful.

There was a feeling that things used to be different:

Probation used to be better when you could tell them things, tell them how you were feeling.
They shouldn’t be called probation any more: they used to do aftercare.
Now they should be called parole officers…. In America they’ve got parole officers: they are hard arses and they take no nonsense, usually ex-policemen, ex-army, that’s how it should be.
This interviewee explained that modern probation officers, ‘these nice young ladies’, are being put into the position that they’ve got to recall people, even when they don’t want to, as they’ve got to take the flack when things go wrong.

One young woman thought her probation officer was scared of her, adding wistfully–
and I don’t want people to be scared of me. Several interviewees showed sympathy for the difficult decisions their probation officers had to make. Several wished they had seen more of their probation officer.
“When things were going well, it didn’t matter that they rarely saw the officer, but
when it goes wrong, the fact that you haven’t developed a relationship is very important as it reflects on how much they will support you.
The threat of recall (the knowledge of the power of the probation officer) clearly stops many offenders being honest with their officer.

Two explicitly didn’t tell their probation officer that they had been arrested as they believed/hoped the charges would be dropped and/or they didn’t want to be recalled. This, of course, then turns into a bad mark in their recall pack.
Another said:
I can’t even tell my probation officer a joke as she might take it wrong. She’s looking for an angle….. Probation come along warping, twisting…and their line managers are always going to believe them.
Many felt very let down by their probation officer now they had been recalled. This was not simply because they perceived the probation officer as ‘two-faced’ (‘I thought we were getting on well’) but also, often, because their probation officer had not bothered to contact them since they had been recalled:I thought probation was alright when I was out there, but once you get recalled they wash their hands off you. I haven’t heard from them at all. He says he’s supporting me, but I haven’t seen anything. I’ve tried ringing my probation officer hundreds of times, but he never calls back. “My girlfriend’s tried him, and she’s getting nowhere. I’ve been here nearly 12 months for something I haven’t done. It’s hard, you’re angry and frustrated, but you can’t show it. One was still trying to give his probation officer the benefit of the doubt:
19 [My probation officer] seems really nice and genuine, but there’s only so many times you can hear her say, give it a couple of weeks…. She’s said that to me so many times.

“Many stressed the difficulty, and enormous cost to them, of contacting their probation officers from prison:

the time it can take to get a number recorded on their prison PIN, and even then it can cost £3 for a call on a mobile.
“”Some thought it was easier for their family to contact their probation officer than it was for them, but others were frustrated that their probation officer refused to discuss their case with their mother, despite the prisoner giving permission.
The real problem, for many, was simply the power of the probation officer: It’s not acceptable that probation officers have so much power: it’s your word against theirs and you may as well be talking to a brick wall.

How does my probation officer have the right to recall me when she’s only met me once for two minutes? She still hasn’t been to see me.
A probation officer just has to snap her fingers and you’re recalled. Probation officer who stabs you in the back…. They don’t help with your problems, they add to them.

There should be more of a process.

They should gather the evidence before they recall you and take it before a judge or a magistrate. It should be the last resort to put someone back in prison – it just seems too easy.

Many echoed this,
arguing strongly that a court and not the probation service should be responsible for recalling them.
Offenders drew stark parallels with the criminal justice process when they were first arrested:
They are quick to get you a solicitor when you are arrested because you might have been wrongly arrested. But you might have been wrongly recalled.

They presume you are guilty. But someone should come and see you.

The prisoners on PPO schemes8 had differing views:

some felt that their police officers understood them better, were prepared to be much more helpful and flexible (for example, in where they might meet: in a car park or a cafe, not the office) than their probation officer. One suggested that the police are more likely to believe your side of the story than probation officers: they understand where you are coming from better.
“One offender offered an example of good practice in the way he had been able to build a relationship with his probation officer, even before release (monthly visits to his probation officer in the months leading to his release from a Cat D prison). Only one appeared genuinely satisfied with their treatment by their probation officer postrecall (the vast majority of probation officers appeared to have simply disappeared off their radar).

Another issue (not directly raised by offenders, but apparent from the files) was whether all probation officers understood the details of the process.

An example came when a prisoner produced a letter from his probation officer which said ‘should the court find you not guilty, then you will be released…’. However, he had been acquitted soon after this letter was received, and was (understandably) deeply 8 Prolific and other Priority Offenders (PPO) schemes, normally run by the police.

20 frustrated in the interview two months later. He had recently received a decision of the Parole Board (via NOMS, as is the usual practice) which said The fact that the case against you has been dismissed is only one factor in the Panel’s assessment of your suitability for release. It is plain that the domestic abuse unit at … have concerns….as the risk you pose is considerably raised….. The Panel has no information as to why it was considered in the interests of justice not to proceed with this matter….

The challenges of living a licence
Most prisoners felt the weight (or what Crewe (2011) calls ‘tightness’) of their conditions:
Licence is like being on a leash: and they are pulling you back. You want to move forward, and you want to move forward in a good way, but you are a human being and, you know, you can only manage it this way, but they are pulling you back and winding you up and stopping you doing things.

You can’t live your life if you have people behind you, telling you you’ve got to do this, you’ve got to do that, “you’ve got to do this course…. You can’t get on with your life. On licence, basically you’re still in prison. But on the roads, on the outside, on the streets. But you are still in prison. They are behind you. Basically they’re like prison officers outside. They are like a judge: they can click their fingers and you are back in prison. Licence conditions can help you, but they can not help you. They can stress you up. You have to do just everything right.
Several suggested that it was easier to do time in prison than on licence, particularly if required to live in Approved Premises, and indeed said that they would actually prefer to do time in prison:
I felt the conditions were suffocating me.
Cameras everywhere, can’t do this, can’t do that.
“As well as cameras and a surfeit of rules, Approved Premises may require offenders to sign in hourly or two hourly. Whilst these signing-in conditions may soon be relaxed, they make it impossible for offenders to look for a job, or even to visit their families, who may well live in a different town.”
Money was an enormous problem: Money is 100% why people fail.
Most offenders come out of prison with almost no money. Getting a job is very difficult. Licence conditions frequently make it even more difficult.

Several interviewees said that they had been working illegally on licence
(largely jobs gained via family members, sometimes via supportive ex-employers), which meant they were lying to their probation officer.
Others had been offered legitimate jobs which their probation officer had said they couldn’t take (for example, building site, or painting and decorating jobs, which would take them out of their home area).

The lack of money exacerbated many of the practical challenges faced by all released offenders.
Accommodation was one nightmare. Another is transport: the cost of public transport is very high, especially for those required to check in with probation, police and various other agencies. One woman was reporting every day, with a one hour bus journey, which, with the waiting times for an hourly bus service, meant this

21 took over three hours every day, and a significant part of her resources (all for a ten minute meeting at the probation office). She seemed somewhat relieved to have been recalled, to escape this routine.
For drug addicts, of course, the pressure to find money is particularly acute.
These practical problems should all be read in the context of the difficult lives which the vast majority of our interviewees had led prior to their sentence: we heard graphic accounts of the difficulties of growing up in abusive families, of growing up in care (for example, one man explained how if things go wrong when you are in care, they move you: ‘you never learn to live with the consequences of things going wrong’.
He recognised that he still finds it difficult not to run away from problems), of fighting drug addiction and the very real difficulties in throwing off a criminal lifestyle.
If you have a little support, and more important, an idea of what you’ll do in the future, you’ve got a chance.

Many spoke eloquently of the challenges faced by some of their fellow inmates: people with drug addictions, no family support, and few skills. The prisoners who had been inside for a long time gave graphic examples of the problems of institutionalisation:
for example, a man reported with some embarrassment how he had stood outside the Job Centre waiting for someone to open the door for him as he had got so used to not opening doors himself. And sex offenders and lifers carry a particular burden, knowing the risk they face if people discover their past: they are forced to live a lie.

The burden is relentless and endless: I get more trust in prison than I do outside: I’m treated here like a human.

Postdate type and timing of recall

(i) Fixed term, or standard recall?
From the files, 5 of the prisoners in Prison A were identified as Fixed Term (FT) recalls, and 7 in Prison B. Seven of the 46 interviewees, were FT recalls. In several dossiers, it was clear that the probation officer had requested a FT recall, and the file does not always record why it became a Standard Recall. Sometimes it was because the probation officer had ignored or forgotten the eligibility criteria for FTR: the offender must not have been convicted on any sexual or violent offence, or have been recalled before (see p.7 above). Yet there were two examples of offenders on their second FT recall on the same sentence, in apparent breach of the rules.
All but one of the FT recalled offenders had been charged with fresh offences. This was surprising in the sense that these were prisoners who had given the police some reason to believe that they were indeed re-offending, and yet they got the ‘soft’ recall option.

Indeed, it would appear that all the charged FT recalls who were interviewed were intending to plead guilty.

Here, the frustration was that, at the end of the fixed term, they should become ‘normal’ remand prisoners (with the extra privileges which come with this unconvicted status), but this did not seem to happen automatically. One prisoner had put in various ‘apps’ on the subject and was desperate to get his status ‘improved’.

22
The majority of the prisoners were standard recalls. This meant, of course, that they were liable to stay in prison until the end of their sentence (including for the extended sentence prisoners the totality of the period imposed by the sentencing judge for ‘extended supervision in the community’). Many had already served over a year back in prison, and some faced a considerably longer period: the lifers and those serving extended sentences, in particular.
These prisoners were all keen to point out how unfair and uncertain they found the process to be (see below).
(ii) Fresh allegations
Of the prisoners interviewed (46), 33 had been recalled for allegations of fresh offences. For some it was a ‘fair cop’: they had no-one to blame but themselves. Several deeply regretted their stupidity:
I had started to feel the person I wanted to be.
One stupid action (here a minor theft) lost him everything he had achieved. These prisoners felt they had let themselves down, as well as their probation officers. Several of the probation officers were clearly surprised by the fact that the offender had been re-arrested, with the recall pack containing comments on how well the offender had been doing on licence.
Some times the offender could explain. For example: My girlfriend went away for the week-end, and I just went stupid.
The files reveal how difficult it is for the probation officer to know what is really going on in the life of the offender, and how some offenders can lead a double life, superficially complying with licence conditions, whilst being drawn back into criminal activity.
But many, particularly those subject to a standard recall, strongly challenged the allegations against them. At least 3 of the interviewed prisoners believed that they had been ‘stitched up’:
someone (an ex-partner, a drug dealing rival, a neighbour to protect her own son) had tipped off the police about them, which had led to their arrest.
(Other examples were clear from the files: one (short-term) prisoner had written to the prison authorities explaining that he thought his probation officer was working with his lying ex-partner to keep him in prison;
another (a lifer) was about to have an oral hearing in which he strongly contested his ex-partner’s allegations). The recall process may be initiated as soon as probation staff are notified that the police have intelligence of further offending, or when the offender is arrested, or not until they are charged.
Unusually, two interviewees were not recalled until after they had been convicted of the subsequent offence. They were merely warned at the moment of arrest. One was not recalled until he was two months into his new sentence: only when he applied for Home Detention Curfew was he identified as someone who should have been recalled.

There is of course considerable discretion exercised by the police as to whether or when to arrest or to charge, but it would seem that the probation officers also exercise some discretion in relation to their response to the police. This is not how most respondents saw it, however:

Whatever police say, probation go with them. 100% they do. 100%.

23 Prisoners felt strongly that they should not be recalled until the offence had been proved in a court of law:
With a recall, if you get arrested, probation just seem to press that button to get you recalled straight away. I don’t think that’s fair. You haven’t been proved guilty or innocent. I think they should at least wait until it goes to court and then decide whether to recall you.
They recall you really fast, but when it comes to getting you out, they don’t want to move.
The nightmare being on recall is that no-one understands your needs. It’s all on you. I’m the one who has to sort this mess out. Someone made an allegation against me, but if I have to get something sorted out that’s wrong in my paperwork,
it’s my money on the phone, my stamps on the letters, it’s me having to find out. They put you in prison, leave you there, and you have to sort it out yourself. The nightmare is not having contact with the right people at the right time. Probation should come and see you straight away, no ifs and buts, and they shouldn’t leave until they are sure they are genuine proven reasons. They should investigate. You mess up once and they bang you back in jail and it’s before you’ve even been proved guilty which is outrageous as far as I am concerned.
There were several accounts of offenders who were bailed by the magistrates’ court but then administratively recalled. Some simply couldn’t understand why their bail wasn’t continued, since the magistrates had carefully weighed up the risk of their absconding or interfering with witnesses: I’m disputing this, and I have never breached bail in my life.
One was told at court just after she had been bailed by the magistrates, that she was being recalled. She was therefore taken downstairs by G4S, who then told her that they didn’t have the authority to keep her and so they advised her to turn herself in to the police the next day. Instead, she disappeared for three weeks, and was now serving those 21 days as having been ‘unlawfully at large’. From her point of view, it would have been better if she had been recalled from court and come straight to prison.
Others were bailed, and learnt in the next couple of days that they were being recalled, often only when the police arrived, though some were told by their probation officers (although two learnt via their mothers, not directly from the probation officer). Some were infuriated about how the system could calculate that they had spent days unlawfully at large, added to the end of their recall.
One having been bailed on electronic tag, was rung by his probation officer on a Thursday to say he would be recalled. He waited in but the police did not come until Monday, because they were short-staffed. But he still had to serve two extra days for being ‘unlawfully at large’.
(iii) Recall without fresh allegations
The remaining 13 interviewees had been recalled for breaching other conditions,
most frequently for ‘unacceptable failures’ and ‘not demonstrating any motivation to comply’.
Because of his or her index offence, anyone serving a sentence for a violent or sexual offence listed in Schedule 15 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, cannot have a fixed term (FT) recall.
This often caused great anger to the offenders concerned. The behaviour that led to recall included being expelled from Approved Premises or a hostel for poor behaviour; failing one or more drugs tests; failing to demonstrate any motivation to deal with drug addiction; not making contact, or losing contact, with their probation officer; failing to engage with the requirements of supervision.

24 The recall system
Seems particularly harsh to those who are not alleged to have reoffended.

They were all refused re-release by the panel of the Parole Board because of their risk of reoffending.

Yet they were, of course, keen to point out that they hadn’t re-offended:

They are still telling me I have got to work on my offending behaviour – but I didn’t go out and re-offend!

The length of time that they spent on recall was seen as unjust, perhaps even more than the actual fact of recall.
Some felt that the recall was justified, to give them a ‘warning shot’. But they could barely believe that they were now remaining in prison for an unspecified number of months, or even years.
Several suggested that there should be fixed term recalls of other periods than just 28 days, or at least fixed-term regular reviews.
For some of these offenders recall was a bolt from the blue. The police turned up and arrested them quite unexpectedly.
Only a few had been warned by their probation officers that the police would be coming.

Whilst this seems harsh, not all offenders saw it this way. One explained how many illegal drugs are brought into prisons by offenders who know that they are about to be recalled: drugs that are well wrapped and secreted in their bodies will not be identified by sniffer dogs, and can be sold for a large profit. Some, it was suggested, may deliberately stage a recall in order to bring drugs into prison, or simply to get another discharge grant.

The recall pack or dossier
Some prisoners had little idea of the reason for their recall, until they received the lengthy recall pack a fortnight or so after their return to prison.

For many prisoners, the recall pack was just too complicated. Some had “not read it, others said they had sent it straight to their solicitor. “””It’s a daunting amount of paperwork to be honest with you; I didn’t really read it.

Some still, at the time of the interview, did not understand whether they were fixed term (FT) or Standard. A few thought the pack was fair (mostly those who had reoffended, and where the probation officer had noted that the offender had been complying well). But there were two particular aspects of the pack which irritated many prisoners:
(i) the negative and often outdated account of the prisoner
The document is written with an eye to justifying recall, so it is not surprising that the emphasis is on what went wrong. Several dossiers were written by an officer who had never met the prisoner (because their own officer was off sick or on holiday).
They disputed many of the facts, as well as the interpretation of events.
Many thought that they had been doing well, for them, in difficult circumstances, but felt that this was not recorded in their probation officer’s narrative.
The recall pack is really nasty: it goes on about what a risk to the public I am as though I am some sort of maniac. I’m not.
25 Many prisoners were desperate about how difficult it is to leave their past behind them, and were articulate about how outdated material from the probation officer allows the Parole Board to focus on their negative aspects, to pick and choose what they believed about an offender.
Probation officers were blamed for deliberately giving a dated and negative account:
She brings up stuff from when I was 16, that’s 12 years ago. And I’d just been clean for 2 years – and that’s not even mentioned. Not one positive thing about me is written in that report. They’re not bothered: they are too busy.
This was a common response. (ii) risk predictions
Many prisoners commented on the dominance of statistical risk predictions. One had asked his solicitor to get ‘them’ to do the calculation again as he couldn’t believe it. This prisoner’s

dossier identified:
Risk of serious harm level: High OGP: 41% within one year,

56% in 2 years OVP:

20% within one year;

32% within 2 years OGRS3:

61% within 1 year,

76% within 2 years “””He was serving two years for burglary, and was dejectedly reconciled to spending the entirety of the rest of his sentence inside.

Another who was depressed by his ‘scores’, which were: Risk of serious harm level:

High OGP: 10% within one year,

18% in 2 years OVP:

14% within one year;

24% within 2 years OGRS3:

12% within 1 year, 21% within 2 years He said:
You’re a file to them, a piece of paper which explains you. But there’s lots more to a person than a piece of paper.
“”For many of the offenders their ‘scores’ made no sense, and clearly some read each other’s packs in the long hours during which they are ‘banged up’:
Probation has said, I’m a medium risk to people I know and a high risk of serious harm to people I don’t know: how do they get there?
My cell mate is in for manslaughter, he’s got a worse record than me and he’s lower risk. It makes no sense.
They classify me as high risk but if I haven’t committed an offence in 8 years: that must affect it somehow. Probation are always saying I’m High Risk. They are rubbing that in your face all the time. Always, consistently, putting it in.
What can I do to lower that risk? … I’ve done all my sentence plan but its done nothing for my risk assessment.

I remember seeing my OASys report but it is full of lies: they go on your record. They say I am highly volatile: well then, why am I an enhanced prisoner with no adjudications?
In fact, this prisoner’s recall papers said that his risk of serious harm level was ‘very high’, whilst his OGP was 10% (low) within one year; OVP 16% (low) within one year, OGRS3 13% (low) within one year.

The analysis which accompanies the 26 statistics in the files often doesn’t give the offender any confidence.

For example, for a sex offender with

very low OGP, OVP and OGRS 3 percentages, but whose Risk of Serious Harm Level was Very High, the officer had written:
Although Mr X’s OGRS score is only 8% likelihood of reconviction within the next 2 years, this is a static risk assessment that calculates his age at first conviction, his current age and the number of court appearances. As we know for sex offenders the score is likely to be higher and indeed his own admission that he has committed more offences than he has been convicted, my clinical assessment places his risk in the high category.

The re-release process
All the interviewees were asked to explain not only their recall, but also what they thought would happen next. Many clearly did not understand the process.

One asked quite seriously: Are there any rules on recall or do they just make it up?

Two thought that being a standard recall meant they should be released after 28 days.

There were several examples of other misunderstandings to be found in the comments which prisoners send in on their ‘release date notification form’, such as ‘This is not right as it’s my first recall I will do 28 days recall’ (not right: since she was serving 27 months for robbery, she was not eligible for FTR). The level of misunderstandings was also clear from the number of written ‘apps’, or applications, on prisoners’ files: repeat requests to know what was going on with their appeal against recall, for example:

I would appreciate it if someone would get back to me to let me know what is going on.

Misunderstandings and written ‘apps’ seemed particularly common in Prison B, where there were many more recalled prisoners, and where the parole administrator did not herself deliver the packs to prisoners. These written ‘apps’ explain, often lucidly, why the prisoner believes they have been wrongly recalled.

Often they ask for help with the process of release, particularly with the Parole Board. The role of the various institutional players in the process was often misunderstood:

several thought it was the Home Office, not the Ministry of Justice, which was recalling them (and this mistake was not only made by the prisoners:

a recall pack disclosed to a prisoner on 1 June 2011 (recalled for failing to have contact with his probation officer, when he said he was told he did not have to do this) stated:

…. In view of the offences for which you were originally sentenced [for which he had received 12 months], the risk suggested by your offending history and your behaviour as described above, the Home Secretary is no longer satisfied that it is right for you to remain on licence.
Several interviewees said things about their probation officer, solicitor, the Parole Board, or the prison which showed only a hazy understanding of the process: for example, there were references to the ‘woman who works for the recall board here’. Or I have had no contact from the Parole Board. I don’t know how they work.

I’ve written to the Parole Board here, and to my probation officer asking if it’s possible to have my parole hearing before the trial so that if I get not guilty I can be released within a day or two. Or can they fix the hearing now. They say I’ve just got to wait for my name to come up.

27 When the prisoner receives their recall pack (by hand in prison A, under the door in Prison B), they are asked to sign a form which says whether or not they want to make representations against recall.

The vast majority in Prison B, and a small majority in Prison A, had said on the form that they wished to make representations. Some ticked all the boxes, or made inconsistent choices, such as ‘I wish to make representations myself’ and ‘I have no wish to make representations’.

Many went on to identify the name of their chosen solicitor, and having completed this form, some prisoners thought (wrongly) that the prison would therefore contact their lawyer for them:
the lady who came with my recall pack noted down the name of my solicitor, but my solicitor is still waiting to get the pack.

Some wrote extra information such as ‘I would like an oral hearing as well plz’. They get no routine feedback: the form is simply passed on to PPU.
A majority of those interviewed had had contact with a solicitor. Sometimes it was their trial solicitor, who had seen them through the whole criminal justice process (and indeed sometimes through earlier sentences) but more often they seemed to have acquired a new solicitor in prison.

In this study, they were not asked specifically about their lawyers, but opinions clearly varied enormously, from ‘he’s poor, very poor’ to ‘she’s brilliant’. Contact was often difficult and sporadic. Several believed that once the police/CPS had dropped the fresh charges against them, they would be instantly released.

One said
The woman who works for the recall board here in the prison told me to get ready to go home as they can’t keep me any longer.
It was difficult to know whether staff were as ignorant of the process as prisoners often suggested. Clearly it was difficult for the prisoners to get information. There was deep frustration that there was no-one in the prison who could or would give straight-forward advice.
Most prisoners did not mention a personal officer, and in any case, knew that the only way they could ask a question about recall was by written ‘app’.

Even that often didn’t help: They don’t do nothing here, the guvs.
The guvs on the wing are absolutely useless. They say yeah yeah and then they don’t do it. Here you put in an app, and they don’t do it.
You ask, can you find out how much money I’ve got and they just don’t do it. …. They just don’t care, they just can’t be bothered. You ask anyone here on the wing, and they’ll tell you the same. They’re just not bothered. Govs here don’t care, don’t care if you drop dead I think.
Things are so slow in prison they practically stop. They don’t know anything here.
they can’t get anything right
No-one helps you with understanding the process. That’s why I am a wing cleaner: basically, ‘cos I can talk to people, get out of my cell, get to talk to my solicitor.
Interestingly, although not asked specifically about this, several in the private prison wanted to draw comparisons with the public sector. The consensus appeared to be along the lines that the private prison was more relaxed, but also more ineffective:

28 Officers here are more like mates: you can have a laugh with them. They are more like us really, not authority figures. But you can’t go and see them about anything serious. If you don’t want to do things here, you don’t have to. ….

In HMP if you don’t do it, you get nickings, your life is made hell.
For many, the system ‘stinks’: one called it a ‘robotic’ system, where officers do nothing.
Many commented on their powerlessness in the system:
Every time I ask them a question, you get a question back, I answer that question, and I get another question back.
Nowadays you go into prison, and it’s up to you to get on with it. Nobody answers you anything. It’s up to you to get on with it. Everything you do in prison now is off your own bat. Nobody will come and see you for anything. You have to put in an app, an app for this, Oh can I see this person, can I see that person….. It’s an abuse of power. They’ve not given me a chance to put my end. It should go back to a court and a judge should decide it.. The recall pack (the first time you get it is 10 days later) is ridiculous, but what can you do? It’s one man against them, a lot of people.
This powerlessness was sometimes exacerbated by their lack of understanding of who really makes the decision.
One prisoner had written on his ‘release date notification slip’,
I am on licence recall and I have been accepted for re-release: my probation is working on securing a hostel place for me and as soon as that is sorted out I will be released. Please confirm with my probation officer (gives name and number).
The recall administrator replied (in writing) that the prison has to wait for a direction to release from the Parole Board. (Since this prisoner had had a ‘no recommendation’ review in November 2010, the administrative staff suggested to me that he was unlikely to have another review before November 2011. Yet he was still expecting, every day, to be told that he was being released).
For many, the biggest problem was the uncertainty.
The probation officer disappears, no-one wants to help, and the prisoner just waits.
Probation don’t even bother to speak to you. You don’t get any input. They set their Boards. We’re just left to rot.
Nothing seemed to be happening to prepare them for their re-release.
Prisoners reported that they had few (if any) opportunities to prove they were ready for rerelease or to address their offending behaviour, and many seemed likely to spend the whole of the remaining part of their sentence inside.
For those on extended sentences, this was likely to be the entirety of a period that the judge had set as an ‘extended period of supervision in the community’. Prisoners knew this:
I think you’ll find it’s the extended recall that’s clogging up the system.
Some prisoners will serve much longer on recall than they did originally: one interviewee was serving a 3 ½ custodial term + 5 years extended licence (for a sexual assault and a driving offence). He was recalled because of concern about his drinking and his inconsistent engagement with his probation officer in the six months after release, and feared he would be inside for the whole extension period. Another man

29 on an extended sentence (3 year custodial term + 3 years extended licence), who was described as a model prisoner, and who had been recalled after being arrested for an alleged assault which had been swiftly dropped (he was never charged) had already served 16 months back in prison. The file gave no evidence of any likely movement (he had been refused an oral hearing). Another pointed out:

I’ve got the equivalent of 5 years for having a bag of weed and a knife on me.
Lifers are both advantaged and disadvantaged by the current system.

Advantages include an interview with a member of staff soon after they have been recalled, and an oral hearing before the Parole Board. The interview, known as a ‘LISP 6, Recall Notification and Induction Interview’, should be completed by the ‘Offender Supervisor and forwarded to PPCS and copied to OM/HPO within 7 days of a recalled ISP’s reception’. As well, ‘a suitably competent and knowledgeable residential officer must be allocated to such prisoners within 24 hours of arrival’ (see PSO 4700).

It is not clear from this study whether this always happens in practice, but there was evidence that the LISP 6 interview can be useful:
one lifer was reported as being ‘in shock’ on recall as he had no idea why he had been recalled: he had been out for six years without problem. His first oral hearing was due shortly after his file was examined: he was strongly contesting what he said were his ex-partner’s invented allegations. It would be interesting to know whether the Parole Board relied on the evidence of the interview. All prisoners appeared to believe that an oral hearing was better/fairer than a review on the papers only.
The disadvantages for lifers include the extraordinary lengths of time they are likely to spend on recall, even when recalled for what appeared to be minor breaches of licence conditions. They are often expected to follow the slow trajectory of recall to a local prison (with no specific facilities for lifers),

where they wait for the Parole Board once more to recommend a transfer to open conditions, when they are ‘tested’ again in open conditions, often for at least a year before the possibility of re-release.
I asked my probation officer why she wouldn’t recommend I be released straight to a hostel. She said she preferred ‘to err on the side of caution’. That was her exact words!
This prisoner had been recommended by the Parole Board for a move to open prison some three months before he was interviewed for this study.
Bureaucratic delays had prevented him being moved until the day after the interview. He had already been back in prison for two and a half years (and not for further offending), and faced a significant time in open conditions.
The Parole Board had directed that another of the lifers who was interviewed should be released directly to a hostel: he had been recalled for failing a drugs test in September 2009, and had remained in Prison A for over six months even after the Parole Board decision to release him, since various hostel arrangements had ‘gone down the pan’ for reasons well beyond his control.
The third lifer was awaiting an oral hearing at the time of the interview, a hearing which had been adjourned six months earlier for further reports9.
The role of the Parole Board and PPU/NOMS 9 This prisoner’s file revealed the impact a judge can try to have by issuing firm directions, requiring better reports and recommendations from probation officers.

30 All recall decisions are reviewed by a (usually) anonymous ‘panel’10 of the Parole Board.

Invariably in this study the Parole Board made no recommendation for release at the first review stage. This is hardly surprising since this group of prisoners were all still in prison. But the ‘panel’ would have had little to consider apart from the recall pack, and a Report for Review dated about a month later:

despite the fact that many of the prisoners had made it clear that they wanted legal representation, often identifying the name of their solicitor, no representations had been received by the Board by the time of this first review in any of the cases in this study.

There were some perceptive comments:
The first review happens so quick that you don’t have a chance to put in anything.
The reasons for this ‘no recommendation’ are sent to prisoners by the Public Protection Casework Section of NOMS, within the Ministry of Justice, and not by Parole Board (see page xx above). Many decisions start:
The Panel has received and taken into account the dossier referred by the Secretary of State on (date). The dossier does not contain an Annex H by the Offender Manager or any indication whether re-release is supported or not. The Panel has not received any written representations on your behalf…..
The reasons were often glossed in expressions such as ‘the dossier is silent as to any progress made since being returned to custody’, or that ‘the Risk Management Plan is somewhat underdeveloped’.
The decisions in these first reviews were usually received by the prisoner about six weeks after being recalled.

Sometimes the review was not so swift.
One woman, who had been recalled for poor behaviour (continued drug use), did not get a letter from PPU until more than 6 months after she had been recalled. Her original sentence was two years for theft and breach of a community order, and it seemed likely that she would be staying in prison until the end of the sentence.
The letter from the Ministry of Justice which attaches the Parole Board’s ‘no recommendation’ decision, explains the next steps for those who want to challenge their recall.

The timetable for prisoners is very tight:
they only have 28 days to appeal a Parole Board decision, but may only receive the decision (via the PPU) after a significant part of that period has elapsed (for example, one prisoner received notification that the Parole Board was making ‘no recommendation’ on 5 January, the decision itself being dated 18 December).
Many prisoners thought that they ought to have an oral hearing. Several had requested one, some successfully, but others were simply told that none of the criteria for an oral hearing had been ‘fully made out’.
One wrote an impassioned letter to the prison parole administrator asking her to get the Parole Board to allow him an oral hearing. The response he eventually gets from the Parole Board refusing the request does not make clear whether or not they have seen this letter: it is a standard one page tick box form which says that having seen the oral hearing request from the prisoner ‘and/or his solicitor’, together with the earlier Paper Recall Panel decision and the dossier they had reviewed, the criteria were not met.
10 Prisoners appear not to realise that this ‘panel’ is one person, often reviewing many dossiers in a day.

31 Sometimes the Parole Board recommends a further review on the papers: I recommend that the Ministry of Justice should re-refer the case once suitable accommodation has been confirmed.
In one case, the Parole Board had held a further paper review within 5 months as this had been recommended by the ‘panel’ which refused the oral hearing: however, despite the Offender Manager’s strong support for re-release, the Board had decided against release. In another case, the panel (which didn’t recommend release)

wrote, ‘the panel is able to set a date for future re-release. However, it is not possible with any surety when you would be free from methadone….’11. (This prisoner’s file showed that the OM supported release but only if the prisoner was off methadone completely. The prisoner wrote in a letter ‘to the members of the Parole Board’, which was on her file, ‘I am trying to come off methadone but it is very hard’).

Once the Parole Board has decided to make no recommendation, the PPU may refer the case back to the Parole Board at any stage. It was difficult to understand from the files, and no prisoner seemed to understand, exactly when and if the PPU would take the initiative to refer a case back to the Parole Board. It would appear to be the usual practice to do so yearly, but it was not clear how rigidly the timetable is adhered to and what could trigger an earlier review.

On the file there would occasionally be a letter from PPU to the prison: further to our request of (eg xx November 2011) for further information to be supplied by (Jan date), PPCCS has not yet received such a report. Please submit it by (a date in March)’.
What was particularly difficult for prisoners was the lack of information: particularly, not knowing when the Parole Board would meet to consider their case12.

Yet several believed that their case was being considered on a certain date, although there was no evidence of this on the file. One prisoner interviewed in June believed that she had had a parole review on 22 March but she had still not heard anything:
The officers say they ask custody, I’ve put in apps and complained to the IMB – everyday I ask my personal officer and he says he’s heard nothing and I’ll be the first to hear when he does. I’m not getting anywhere with them, I feel they just can’t be bothered. (Her file gave no evidence which suggested a March review, only that that the PPCU would be reconsidering the case and wanted prison reports by a date in June).

Others recognised that they would get no clue of the timetable:
I’ll just get a white envelope under the door, which will tell me if I’m getting out. I should be told the exact date when they are going to meet, and I should get the paperwork, which they are going to get, but I don’t. I don’t know if my solicitor does.
There were many painful uncertainties: knowing that a probation officer had to send in a report, which may or may not have happened, knowing that their solicitor was on the case, but not knowing what was actually happening.
11 Whilst this study did not focus on Parole Board procedures, it is worth pointing out that minor errors were frequently to be found in decision letters, particularly first review letters.
12 It would appear that extended sentence prisoners and those on the old DCR process should be informed of the date of paper panels, but the majority of recalled prisoners are not informed of” any date or timetable.

32 The process is painfully slow:

one man had been acquitted at trial on the fresh offence (‘I always said it was absolutely nothing to do with me and the judge agreed’) more than two months before the interview. He had been arrested and recalled for this alleged offence some 11 months before the interview. He was deeply unhappy about the impossibility of challenging what to him was a ‘presumption of guilt’ assumed by the Parole Board, which to him was all wrong. He had no idea when he would be getting out:
I’ve been here nearly 12 months for something I haven’t done. It’s hard, you’re angry and frustrated, but you can’t show it.

Several felt that although their recall itself was fair, they were serving an unfair time back on recall.

For example, one man, who had been sentenced to 6 weeks for a common assault committed whilst on licence, was now serving 11 months on recall, which he well understood was the equivalent of a 2 year sentence. He had been in employment when recalled and was particularly articulate on the emotional and financial costs to his family: I have my missus on the phone crying ‘cos she doesn’t know what’s going on, and she has to pay the bills and all.

The consequences of recall were often much more than just the loss of a job or accommodation:

My daughter’s mother had encouraged me to rebuild a relationship with my daughter but she said if I got recalled or re-offended she’d move away. I can see that. But I have been recalled for something I haven’t done.
This recall was not based on any allegations of further offences, but on police intelligence that the offender had been accessing a computer in breach of his licence (for the second time), which showed ‘a lack of motivation to achieve his sentence plan’. The allegations were strongly denied.

There was considerable evidence here of the delays which can occur due to factors way beyond the control of the offender:

late reports,
or oral hearings
being deferred as the prisoner has been moved prison,

or because the prison ‘was not in a position to be able to accommodate this hearing on that date’ (which resulted in a delay of more than six weeks).

One prisoner’s oral hearing was adjourned in January 2011 for the preparation of a release plan, and the case was reconsidered on the papers in midJune. The decision letter explained that the Offender Manager did not support the prisoner’s immediate re-release ‘but her view and the view of MAPPA was that it may be of benefit if there could be a short period when you could be supported in the community before the end of your sentence’ (this seemed to be unlikely since the sentence expired four months later and no review had been initiated). panels are ‘statutory arrangements for managing all sexual and some violent offenders. MAPPA is not a statutory body in itself but is a mechanism through which the police, prison and probation services can better discharge their statutory responsibilities and protect the public in a co-ordinated manner with co-operation from other statutory agencies, including local authorities, health, housing authorities and education authorities’ (definition taken from para 157, House of Commons, Justice Committee (2011

The interplay between PPU/NOMS and the Parole Board seemed to slow progress down. Thus for one lifer (recalled for failing a drugs test), NOMS seemed reluctant to prepare a new sentence plan until after a Parole Board hearing. Yet that hearing was itself deferred more than once. More than once it was clear that an offender manager would give conditional support for release, if for example satisfactory accommodation could be found, or bed space confirmed. Yet the moment passed as a Parole Board hearing came and went.

33
The role of MAPPA13
Although it was not an issue raised by the interviewers, many offenders raised MAPPA issues in their interviews. Occasionally MAPPA was seen as something positive: I’m MAPPA 2 which means that they had to get me somewhere to live. But more often MAPPA was part of the problem, part of the very invisible ‘system’ which was determined to have them back inside: once the label had been attached to them, it took on a life of its own.

Several prisoners would explain their situation with the preamble, Because I’m MAPPA, …..

Others suggested that MAPPA was behind their recall, although one had been surprised to learn that MAPPA didn’t even know he’d been recalled.

Emotional responses to recall: from anger to despair
There was no doubting the frustration felt by many of those we interviewed. The system was described as corrupt, and unfair (many times).

One prisoner had written in a formal complaint which summarises the feelings of many we interviewed.

He asked to be let out and not sit on recall rotting when I have been found not guilty. I understand things take time but we’re talking about me sitting in a prison cell for something that I have been found not guilty of. Please will you talk to the people who deal with this and ask them to let me know what is going on. Thanks.

A few days later he had heard that the Parole Board had not recommended his rerelease and, although he realised he was facing many months more in prison, he was determined to fight what he perceived as a real injustice. In interview (several weeks after this written complain had been submitted)

he added:

I am angry: it is disgraceful: all this is doing is pushing me back into a life which I was trying to get away from. … It is disgusting, it’s horrible, it’s unlawful…. You have 28 days to appeal and I’ve lost 3 weeks already trying to get my solicitor on to my PIN. The prison tells you it’s nothing to do with them. Your probation officer say it’s nothing to do with him. They all just wash their hands of you. They’ve got such a backlog that once you’ve been knocked back, you go to the bottom of the pile.

Many were full of despair14 (perhaps in particular those with significant mental health issues and the long-term drug addicts): 13 Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements

This mentally ill prisoner had been recalled for missing appointments, not for allegations of re-offending.] 34 I hate prison but I can’t cope outside. I feel I’m lost between two places. I want to succeed but it’s overwhelming. … It’s like they are leaving me here to rot. I am just on hold. I have been on hold for nine months now. Sometimes the despair was fuelled by the realisation that they had been doing so well (for them, by their standards), but now they were back, facing more problems than ever, often losing a flat, or losing a relationship: There are a lot of ways of dealing with a problem, but locking them up doesn’t help, it’s like sweeping them under the carpet.
Prison doesn’t help. It’s violent. If someone hits you, you have to hit them.
Coming out was going to be even more difficult next time: Your friends have mortgages: but you have to start right back at the bottom and it’s a steep hill to climb.
Two foreign nationals volunteered information about racist attitudes in prison, both suffering bullying at the hands of other prisoners, and one identifying lower priority and second class treatment towards black offenders from staff:
This prison is very, very, very racial. Interviewer: That’s three ‘very’s. You could put six of them
Sometimes the despair was fuelled by fear of the next sentence, which might well be IPP (indeterminate): “”it’s a killer, mate: my mate got a 13 month tariff, and he’s done 6 years. It’s hard. They just don’t want to release people. He’s got his parole coming up, and he says he hasn’t got another 2 years in him if he gets refused. He can’t do it.

Deaths 14 29 (14%) of the 208 prisoners who killed themselves in prison were recalled prisoners: see Prison and Probation Ombudsman (2011), at page 9

Discussion Complexity and confusion
There can be no doubt that sentencing and recall law and practice is deeply complex, and confusing for those who administer it, let alone the prisoners who ‘experience’ it.

There is a wide variety of different sentencing options (including different forms of life sentence and different forms of extended sentence) and licence conditions vary enormously.
It seems self-evident that the whole process should be simplified, and that it should be explained more transparently to prisoners.
There should also be more clarity about what the process of recall is meant to achieve.
Prisoners are released under licence ‘to protect the public, to prevent re-offending and to secure the successful re-integration of the offender into the community’ (see PI 07/11).
Yet they are recalled to prison usually because their probation officer fears that they are going to re-offend, or that they are becoming ‘unmanageable’. This means, paradoxically, that they may in fact become more likely to re-offend and not less likely; certainly their route to successful reintegration is made more difficult. The prisoners in this study were often deeply alienated and dejected by their experience of recall.
Licence conditions often appear more targeted towards public protection than reintegration.
What is more, prisoners were often released from prison with little support, and often felt dropped back into ‘society’ with little money, little occupation, and poor accommodation.
Those who were released to hostel accommodation often felt the weight of conditions designed to ‘protect the public’ far outweighed the support they needed to successfully re-integrate.
In many ways, it is extraordinary that more do not ‘fail’. Could more of the ‘penal budget’ be spent on preparing prisoners for their release and supporting them on release? Once they are recalled the position seems worse: none of the prisoners interviewed in this study felt that they were, in any real sense, being encouraged to prepare for the challenge of their next release. Of course, they can try and take the initiative, but the absence of supportive personal officers or offender supervisors or probation officers from their current prison narratives was surprising. In fact, because they had been recalled, many would be released at the end of their sentence, with no support whatsoever. Preparing for that release seemed all the more important.
“There is much confusion about who actually makes key decisions.
It would appear that even though the PPU has the right to refer cases back to the Parole Board at any stage, there was no obvious mechanism to ensure that all cases were reviewed as swiftly as possible.

“””Yet since the enactment of s. 255C(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the Secretary of State has the power to release a recalled prisoner at any time. How often does this happen?

It is difficult not to share the perception of many prisoners that once their probation officer has recalled them to prison, not only can the individual officer relax a bit, but the whole system then slows down. The prisoner is likely to spend many months in prison.
How can the system be changed to create a culture whereby recall is seen as a ‘failure’ on the part of the system, as well as the offender? A starting point would be a less complex and contradictory system.

36 There is nothing new in suggesting that human rights should not be buried beneath public protection priorities (see Padfield, 2002, 2007, Young et al, 2005, Wood and Kemshall, 2007).

“””Much greater emphasis should be given to the rights of those who had been led to believe that, if all went well, they would be serving the remainder of their sentence in the community. The fact that the system pays so little regard for procedural fairness decreases the offender’s motivation and their respect for authority (see Paternoster et al, 1997; Digard, 2010).

Despite many attempts to join up the prison and probation system, to create ‘beginning to end offender management’, this study revealed how unclear it is who is actually managing individual offenders through the system:

Is it the probation officer,prison staff, or the PPU and other staff in NOMSand the Ministry of Justice?

Whoever it is, it is clearly an executive or administrative form of management with little, if any, judicial involvement.

The idea of an Offender Manager who manages a prisoner’s sentence is attractive: someone with ownership of the sentence plan and who can see that it works.

But the reality is that the only person who can really ‘manage’ a prisoner’s path to reintegration is the prisoner him or herself.

They need to feel that they can take some responsibility for the way the sentence evolves. The current system appears to make them mere recipients of a distant process. The prisoners in this study, in both prisons, gave no feeling that there was anyone taking the lead in helping them secure a re-release. Many of them called for more judicial oversight, and this could be helpful, indeed empowering, at many stages in the process.
Before Recall
Licence conditions, which should be carefully limited to those which are necessary and proportionate, can appear to make it particularly difficult for prisoners to lead law-abiding lives. Many of the examples of what prisoners perceived as unfair conditions suggested what Turnbull and Hannah-Moffat (2009) called ‘unspoken expectations for reintegration’. They are imposed on prisoners for their own good, but without any real discussion or debate. In reality, conditions are numerous and sometimes difficult to understand.

Indeed, the official guidance appears to encourage a certain ambivalence. For example, PI 07/2011 (issued on 21 April 2011)

Says on the ‘good behaviour’ condition:
For both determinate and indeterminate offenders the good behaviour condition is designed to cover the majority of eventualities.

For example, it can be used to deal with failure to adhere to Approved Premises rules, associating with other known offenders, inciting hatred in respect of extremist offenders, and any behaviour or incident that might give rise to an increased risk of serious harm or re-offending. Additional conditions should only be used to cover specific areas of concern which Offender Managers feel cannot explicitly be covered by this condition. In short, the ‘Good Behaviour’ condition contains sufficient authority to manage the majority of risks in the community (para 2.11).

Since this ‘good behaviour’ condition is to cover the ‘majority of eventualities’, it is not surprising that offenders find it too broad. From offenders’ perspectives, conditions were imposed from outside, by a ‘system’ which appeared to try to fit them into ‘boxes’, whilst paying little recognition to their individuality. McIvor et al (2009) suggest that women, in particular, need flexible and

37 tailored support, building upon relationships established while they were in prisons. There is no reason to believe that it is only women who need such individualised support. Prisoners were articulate about the difficulty of living life on licence, and about the reality that people weren’t released with equal chances of success.

Licence conditions need to be debated and discussed: perhaps informally during a face-to-face meeting, or perhaps more formally, before a court.This might also help underline that the moment of release is not the end of the sentence, but simply the next stage in a sentence, which is now being served in the community.

Prisoners made it clear that much more could be done to help them get jobs and accommodation, and to support them generally. They faced extraordinary challenges on release. Many were clearly devastated to find themselves back in prison, facing an even longer road to re-settlement. Yet, to cite Pager (2006),
It is unlikely that we can count on a revival of public services to buffer the reintegration of offenders (at page 510). This seems short-sighted. Nor should the rising financial costs to offenders of their supervision be ignored. This is what Durnescu calls ‘incidental punishment’.

His argument that ‘the State as a duty bearer is under an obligation to minimise or to compensate individuals for this unintended punishment, by paying the travel costs from home to the probation office’ (Durnescu, 2010, p. 542) makes sense in the context of this study.

Particular sensitivity is required where an offender manager requires an offender to attend therapy or a session with a psychiatrist or psychologist. Good practice (PI 07/2011, page 11) advises that the psychiatrist or psychologist must be named and must be willing to treat the offender concerned. This was not obviously the practice in all cases in this study.
A key issue is the role of the probation officer. Their role as strict licence enforcer is perceived by prisoners as a significant limitation on their ability to assist and advise. Is the probation role in licence enforcement incompatible with their supporting role? The way probation supervision is constructed seems to encourage the offender to ‘play the system’ (see Rex, 1999). What little trust there may be between officer and offender when they are on licence often breaks down once the decision has been taken to recall them.

Their probation officer does not maintain contact once they are recalled, and often the written reasons for recall appear inadequately to recognise their positive achievements.
Prisoners were well aware of the pressures on their probation officers: they saw them as having too many offenders on their lists, and too little time to spend with them.

More could be done to make clear that recall was not the personal decision of the individual officer.
The role of MAPPA, standing, in a sense, invisibly behind the probation officer, has become very important. Probation officers can use the MAPPP, or hide behind it to explain difficult decisions. It was only as interviews progressed that it became clear that prisoners considered their MAPPA status to be important, having both positive and negative impacts on them. Future research should explore the role of MAPPA explicitly. The impact of MAPPA on decisions to recall may be large: as PI 2011/07 makes clear (at 2.19):

38
MAPPA meetings do not have the authority to set licence conditions; their role is to make recommendations based on previous offending behaviour, criminal associations, victim considerations and any other community risk factor. It is for the Offender Manager to make requests for additional licence conditions as part of their Risk Management Plan.

Clearly much ‘intelligence’ discussed at MAPPA will not be disclosed to offenders, but this culture of confidentiality, which inevitably means a lack of openness and transparency, can be counter-productive, and indeed may lead to inefficiency and unfairness unless carefully examined and challenged.

Wood and Kemshall (2007) wisely recommended that information leaflets should be developed for offenders subject to MAPPA. Recall itself
Recall is initiated by the probation officer, who recommends standard or fixed term (FT) recall. In this study, FT was relatively rare, and used exclusively in the case of those who were alleged to have re-offended.

Thus it seems to be used as a way to get those who may have re-offended back to prison quickly thereby giving the criminal justice system a month to decide whether to remand them in custody and whether to proceed further with the new charge.

Yet it seems ineffective in this role, and also very unfair:

magistrates might be prepared to grant bail, yet the offender is still recalled.

The presumption of innocence, so important at the pre-trial stage, is secondary to the recall process. FT recall also leads to uncertainties in prison: once the fixed term recall period is over, if the prisoner is still detained by order of a court, he or she should become a remand prisoner, with increased rights and privileges. But this does not always happen as it should.

This is not to say that there is no place for FT recall. It may well have a useful function as a ‘warning shot’ or even as a deterrent: ‘we are serious: if you don’t comply, you can be recalled to prison for the entirety of your sentence. For now it is just 28 days’. But there were no examples of FT recall being used in this way in this study. Probably this is because of the enormously restrictive rules for FT recall: an offender convicted of a sexual or violent offence is not eligible for a fixed term recall.

This might be because Parliament/the Government in introducing these ‘FT’ recalls was nervous of appearing to remove the ‘public protection’ of a Parole Board review: the public could be re-assured that only the Parole Board would re-release such offenders.

But in practice this restriction makes no sense since the executive does have the power to re-release. Further research should be carried out into the use of FT recall (one probation officer suggested that the introduction of FT recall may well explain the steep rise in the number of recalls).

There is a strong argument

There are strong arguments for suggesting that all recalls should be fixed term: renewable, but only after a meaningful (judicial) review. This would focus attention on the need to justify keeping the offender in prison. In the past, sentencing courts had a role in deciding whether or not a previous licence should or should not be revoked.

This role has been removed, but not replaced with an alternative judicial procedure. Many prisoners drew perceptive parallels with their rights at the beginning of the criminal justice process, which included the right to a lawyer in the police station and the presumption of innocence, with their lack of rights on recall.

39 One of the main research questions in this study was

‘What can be done to reduce the number of prisoners recalled to prison’?

The answer that comes most clearly from this study, raised by several prisoners, is that a more judicialised process might work better in this way. Amongst others, Judge Samuels has argued (see Samuels, 2004) for such a system of review courts which would allow an offender to be more actively engaged in his sentence planning, and indeed to influence the time which he must serve in custody, as well as the time for which he will be on licence in the community, by complying in all respects with the requirements of his offender manager.

Review courts, he suggested, as well as encouraging the individual offender to aim for early release through a structured rehabilitation programme, could have a significant impact on reducing the prison population. The idea is similar to the French system of ‘juge d’application des peines’, on which see Padfield (2011b). Even if a judicalised ‘review court’ or ‘parole court’ is out of the question, it would appear that more could be done by investing more heavily in probation support to save the extra cost of further imprisonment.

For example

more Approved Premises, serving as local prisons, could reduce the pressure on the main prison system.
More drug detox schemes and smaller workloads would both be useful.
More funding for the probation service is not however a political priority.
Serving a period of recall The overwhelming impression given by recalled prisoners was that they had little knowledge or understanding of what was being done to progress their case. The invisibility of those empowered to make the decision to release them, and the uncertainty which surrounds the release process were both enormously debilitating
Parole Board panels were perceived simply as part of a distant bureaucracy which takes unreasonable and uncertain time to reach decisions.
Prisoners felt that they were not given reliable information on future release.
Prison staff were seen as uninformed, or at worst, deliberately unhelpful.

There was widespread misunderstanding of the process: for example, the criteria for the somewhat rare ‘fixed term’ recall; or whether a ‘standard’ recall is for a fixed or indefinite term. Even those who understood the process were deeply frustrated by it. It was surprising how little time any member of the prison or probation staff spent talking with offenders about the process.

Offenders felt that they had been left just ‘rotting’ in prison. This is not to criticize any individual members of staff: it would appear that those in regular contact with prisoners have little knowledge of the release system, and little influence over it. And those whose job was to administer the process appeared over-stretched. Yet this too seems like a shortsighted policy.

More time spent with prisoners might short cut the system in many ways.

In one case the Parole Board had concluded that unless the prisoner ‘has some explanation for her behaviour, the assessment of the manageability of risk is restricted’. Yet this prisoner had a clear, articulate and lengthy explanation freely given to a sympathetic researcher with time to listen.

It seems appropriate to argue that all these recalled prisoners deserved some kind of ‘oral hearing’. Many misunderstanding could have been untangled.

For example,

there are doubtless criminals manipulating the system to get their rivals recalled, and ex-partners with old scores to settle. It is difficult to see how these issues can be resolved without a judicial hearing. To the prisoners, the system lacks legitimacy simply because no-one, or no-one empowered to take””

40 decisions, appears to listen to their side of the story. They have become mere pawns in an invisible system.

Who should be advising the prisoner?

It is in everyone’s interests that prisoners become successfully reintegrated into the non-prison world as soon as is practicable. It is beyond the scope of this study to evaluate whether prisoners had access to good, competent or incompetent lawyers. But it was clear that recalled offenders appear to get very little advice.

Would it not save money in the long run if prisoners had an advisor, based regularly on the wings to help speed along their cases, and to champion their cause? Clinics on wings could be run by prison or probation staff, volunteers like the Citizens Advice Board, or indeed the Independent Monitoring Board, whose remit includes monitoring the way prisoners are progressed through the system. If recalled prisoners had a ‘champion’ whose job was to help them work their way towards release, the system could be both cheaper and more effective. PSO 4700 is edging towards this by encouraging staff to help indeterminate sentence prisoners with their submissions, and goes so far as to say (in para 4.5.25)

Where appropriate (e.g. where the prisoner has illiteracy problems,

is a foreign language speaker or has learning difficulties), additional measures may be necessary to ensure they are given an opportunity to make representations and these should also be “documented.
But the invisibility of ‘personal officers’ or ‘offender supervisors’ from prisoners’ narratives has already been noted. Serving a period of recall can be very difficult. It is uncertain, and nothing happens very fast.
Policy makers need to put much greater focus on why so many people are recalled, and for such lengthy periods.
The Parole Board
Whilst the focus of this report was not the working practices of the Parole Board, the research raises important questions. One-member paper panels which review the initial recall appeared here to be little more than a rubber stamp

. The Annual Report of the Parole Board 2010-11 provides the following data

On recommendations made for determinate recall cases considered under the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 for 2010/11:
Agree to release immediately

642 Agree to Release at “future date 1,095

Make no Recommendation 12,251

Send to Oral Hearing 171 Total decisions: 14,159

This is a process which should be seriously reviewed:

it is not surprising on the basis of this research that 86.5% of the reviews were unsuccessful: the prisoner has only recently been recalled, and there is usually no paperwork submitted by the prisoner available to the busy single member of the Board to review.
In fact, it is surprising that there are so many recommendations for re-release. Perhaps the 642 who were ordered to be released immediately should not have been recalled in the first place?
There are strong arguments for bringing this first review forward, to pre-date the actual recall (except in the case of ‘emergency’ recalls).

Alternatively the review should not happen until the prisoner’s representations have actually been received. In this study, many prisoners had made it clear on receipt of the parole pack that they.

41 wished to make representations against recall: why did the review invariably then happen without these representations having been received? It seems extraordinary that no-one has the responsibility to ensure that prisoners’ representations are received promptly and efficiently before the hearing.
Perhaps occasionally the Board’s initial review does uncover procedural irregularities, but not one of the prisoners in this study who were challenging their recall had been re-assured that their recall had been properly reviewed.

There remain huge uncertainties:
- who gets an oral hearing and who doesn’t
- whose case gets re-reviewed by PPU and when
- whose case gets re-reviewed by the Parole Board and when
The criteria for an oral hearing remain opaque. In a recent decision in the Court of Appeal15, Moses

LJ spoke of:
the difficulty, if not impossibility, of drawing any identifiable line to distinguish between those cases in which an oral hearing ought to take place and those in which there is no such need (at para 54). He went on: It is likely that where there is a dispute of fact relevant to the Board’s decision, an oral hearing should take place. But it is not possible to be dogmatic where there is no such dispute. It is understandable that, in attempting to identify those cases where no oral hearing is required, the Board and the courts speak of cases where there is no realistic prospect of the Board’s judgment being affected by an oral hearing.

The Parole Board’s current guidance, developed as a result of this case, remains if not unclear, hard to apply in practice.

A fairer process would allow an oral hearing in many more cases. There were plenty of examples on the files of the value of judicial involvement, of judges who chair ‘oral hearings’ trying to push hard to extract further reports from offender managers:

it can appear too easy for them to play for time, or to hedge their recommendations with vague statements such as ‘there may be a possibility of a temporary move to’.

Prisoners were well aware of this:
I could have been out last Christmas if the probation officer had done what the judge told him to do.

Another problem created where there is no oral hearing is that the perception is reinforced that the Parole Board is merely a part of the administrative ‘system’. It is not seen as an independent court or tribunal, and indeed how could it be?

The first review carried out by a single member of the Board appears no more ‘independent’ than the review of the initial decision to recall carried out by a supervising probation officer. The one-member panel working through a pile of dossiers is unlikely to have any material apart from that prepared by the probation service and PPU. Prisoners are not informed of the date of subsequent reviews and await the result which comes via a letter from the Ministry of Justice. It is high time that Parole Board was recast as a truly independent court or tribunal (see Padfield, 2009b, 2011c).
15 R. (on the application of Osborn and Booth) v Parole Board [2010]EWCA Civ 1409.

Predicting the risk of re-offending
Prisoners are often frustrated and confused by the risk predictions which appear in their recall file.

Indeed, the actuarial predictions combined with the more clinical assessments were often difficult to understand.

It would appear that probation officers were only prepared to tolerate a low level of risk (of serious re-offending). It is beyond the scope of this study to assess what is an ‘acceptable risk’ but there are strong arguments for moving away from attempting to measure acceptable levels of risk, to considering what are proportionate sentencing and recall sanctions.

Perhaps officers should be encouraged to explore new ways of thinking less defensively, or more courageously (as one probation officer put it), about risk?

The literature is clear that it is difficult to predict with any certainty who precisely will re-offend. In the study by Craissati and Sindall (2009), for example, much of the serious re-offending was clearly unpredicted by probation officers, as was the case in this study (where most of the re-offending was less ‘serious’). The social context of offending seems more important than any actuarial or clinical predictor.

Not only are the written risk predictors difficult to understand, they may well also make it more difficult for offenders to ‘go straight’ (see Maruna, 2001). Offenders can be demotivated by constant reference to the level of risk that they present.

Levels of inconsistency in sentencing
This is a study of ‘backdoor’ sentencing (see Padfield (2009)). It highlights the anomaly that, whilst much time and effort has been focused on improving consistency in ‘front door’ sentencing (see the work of the Sentencing Guidelines Council and now the Sentencing Council, for example), there are widespread inconsistencies in ‘back door’ decision-making.

Yet how much has actually been achieved in terms of achieving ‘consistency’ in ‘front door’ sentencing?

Prisoners are well aware that there are inconsistencies in practice. Even now, little is known about how judges and magistrates actually reach their sentencing decisions, but this study would suggest that there would be much to be said for developing a better process of sentence review.

It has already been suggested that there are strong arguments for establishing review courts.

Another argument for them is that a review would recognise that a judge when imposing a sentencing is imposing only a provisional sentence, which can and should be regularly reviewed by a judicial authority.
The importance of media and political responsibility
It makes you feel that your opinions, your feelings aren’t worth anything to them.
Prisoners have nothing if not time on their hands. They are well aware of what is being said about them in the media and by politicians. One raised a particularly interesting example:

David Cameron said it made him physically sick to think of giving prisoners the vote. If they don’t give your life any value, how can they teach you to value life?

43 The President of the National Council of IMBs wrote to the Secretary of State for Justice in February 2011-16 saying, any denial of voting rights to prisoners, whose punishment is simply that they are held in custody, constitutes a breach of the fairness and respect which we are appointed by you to monitor. It follows that the Council would hope for the most generous possible legislative change.

The denial of voting rights is a small example of how the wider ‘system’ is seen to be working against rehabilitation and reintegration.
Politicians should lead by paying better regard to the resettlement rights of prisoners.
As Maguire and Raynor (2006) write: perhaps the most fundamental question is not whether society can resettle prisoners (probably it can), but whether it really wants to.

Attempts to reduce the social exclusion of released prisoners need to be informed by a positive approach to their value as human beings and their potential contribution as participants in society, as argued in the emerging literature on ‘strengths-based’ approaches to rehabilitation (citations removed). Such attitudes and approaches are not easily cultivated in a context of public hostility and vindictiveness towards offenders, fed by the populist rhetoric of politicians preoccupied with a need to appear ‘tough’. A real and sustained improvement in resettlement services to prisoners would require a significant degree of political leadership, and only time will tell whether this will be forthcoming. 16 See www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/guidance/inspectionmonitoring/Kenneth_Clark__prisoners_voting_rights_09-02-2011.pdf

44 Conclusions and recommendations

Recall is a costly process, to offenders, to their families and to the tax-paying public.

Yet many of the offenders interviewed in this study did not appear to need to be in prison for public protection, certainly not in the sense of being a vivid ‘danger’ to society.
Whilst there was a risk of them re-reoffending, for many this risk seemed to be exacerbated, rather than reduced, by some licence conditions and particularly by further imprisonment.
Recall is a very blunt instrument, particularly if the priority to be achieved is re-integration.
Some prisoners appear to be appropriately recalled to prison. These offenders should be much better supported to understand what they can do to further their chances of re-release. Much more could be done to help them understand the process.
In this study, the majority of prisoners had been recalled for alleged further offences. However, there were wide variations in practice, particularly in relation to the timing of recall.
There are strong arguments for classifying them as remand or unconvicted prisoners, rather than recalled offenders17. The system would be fairer if the sentencing judge were to decide what period of the remand should count as recall on the previous sentence, and what part counted towards the current sentence. If or when they are later convicted, and a judge comes to sentence them for these later offences, they will receive a longer sentence for this offence because they were offending whilst on licence: section 143(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides that the court must treat each previous conviction as an aggravating factor if the court considers that it can reasonably be so treated. Under the current system, prisoners who have already been recalled, are likely to feel doubly punished, facing a longer sentence as well as a period of recall. The rules need to be clear and transparent to avoid inconsistency and apparent double-counting.
If charges are not brought following recall for alleged re-offending, or are subsequently dropped, the recall should be reviewed immediately, or, at the very least, swiftly and transparently.

An important minority of offenders in this study were recalled not for re-offending, but for breaching other licence conditions. Here, the reasons were often not easily understood.

It is particularly important that these prisoners get good quality oral and written advice.
The reasons for their recall need to be challengeable in a way which is transparently fair. Their route to re-release needs to be actively facilitated. Possible policy implications:
Sentence management: ‘beginning to end’
sentence management should include the transition of offenders from prison to the community (and, if necessary and appropriate, back to prison). Licence conditions should be discussed with offenders pre-release, and conditions should be regularly reviewed to ensure that they remain 17 There could be a presumption against bail for those charged with serious offences committed on licence, but the justification for this would need to be carefully articulated.

45 necessary, proportionate and understood. There needs to be a review of the way prisoner’s progress from prison to the community,

for example, via Approved Premises. Probation officers should actively supervise ‘their’ offenders whilst they are in custody, and their role as both licence enforcer and sympathetic supporter of released offenders needs review18.
- The role of the courts in the management of offenders. The law and practice on bail and recall, in the light of what is clearly inconsistent current practice, needs review.

Priority should be given to the codification of sentencing law, to include the law on release and recall, including the powers and practice of the Parole Board (a review should consider whether sentence review courts would work better to encourage offenders to earn their way out of prison and off supervision, and also to encourage NOMS to provide swift, well prepared support packages).

- Human rights and fairness issues.

Future research should explore:
- the perceptions of recall by other criminal justice professionals and participants, including other offenders, and not only those currently in prison. For example, an analysis of the perceptions of those subsequently re-released would complement this study.

- the ways different sentences are implemented in practice (exploring, for example, the realities of serving an extended sentence, as well as life and IPP sentences).

- the current use of recall by probation officers (building, perhaps, on the small study carried out by Collins, 2007). This could include the use of different forms of recall (standard, fixed term, and emergency recall), the use of non-disclosed ‘intelligence’, and the use of other ‘sanctions’ apart from recall.

- whether there are better ways to stimulate good behaviour, to increase individual motivation, and to prepare prisoners prior to release (see Solomon et al, 2005).

- the role of the probation officer, in the light of the development of MAPPA, PPO schemes, and the changing role of the police in the supervision of offenders.

- comparative research (particularly in European jurisdictions) on both the law 18 See also the recommendations of the House of Commons, Justice Committee (2011), paras 110-111: ‘There needs to be a better, more seamless, approach to managing offenders. Prisoners are shunted between one establishment and another, in an attempt to avoid overcrowding, and the need to ensure continuity of their sentence plan is not a priority. This is unacceptable.

The MoJ and NOMS need to devise and implement a strategy to ensure that the end-to-end management of offenders is a reality and not just an unachieved aspiration. If NOMS is to work effectively through the two services, there does need to be an enhancement in prison of offender management skills. This could be achieved through better training for prison officers or the appointment of probation officers or probation service officers to work in prisons on sentence management and to follow the prisoner ‘through the gate’.

Unfortunately, neither of these scenarios is likely given the current prison population and funding restraints.’

46 and practice in this area.

Many of the prisoners in this study had had little support whilst on licence.

Back in prison, far from receiving additional support, they could pass weeks, indeed months, wondering what was happening to their ‘case’. Prisoners described a level of supportive activity in prison which often seemed almost non-existent.

This is inhumane, unfair and counter-productive. It was also a wasted opportunity. An outsider might imagine that levels of support and care might reach their peak as prisoners work towards re-release. What this small study would suggest is that, if the ‘system’ of recall is to be perceived as fair and legitimate, prisoners deserve more information, more advice, more certainty and much less delay.

Our research findings will feed into the debate on how to reduce the number of prisoners who are recalled. You are under no obligation to talk to us, but information gathered from the experiences you are willing to talk about, will help raise policy makers’ “””awareness of any changes that may need to be made.

I am the lead researcher. I am a senior lecturer in law at Cambridge, and am also a Recorder (part-time Crown Court judge). I will be conducting some of the interviews. Others will be conducted by Christopher Padfield, who is Vice-Chair of Bedford IMB.
NOMS (the Prison Service as well as the Governor here) have agreed to allow us to spend some time in two prisons to study the reality of the recall process. We would be very grateful if you would allow us to
(i) Interview you, in order to allow us better to understand your views on the recall process; (ii) Look at your prison file in order to collect data on, for example, your sentence, reason for recall etc.; (iii) Talk to your probation officer, and other staff involved in your sentence management.

We well recognise that this is a very difficult time for you. We must stress that we are not in a position to affect the decision to recall you, or the decision to re-release you. If you need extra support or counselling, we suggest you ask to speak to your personal officer, or to a Listener.
Any information that you give us will remain confidential. Neither your name, nor any other details by which you could be identified, will be made available to any other person in prison or outside. We would like your permission to tape-record the interview. This will be transcribed, and we will use quotations from the interviews to illustrate our report.

We will keep the recordings secure in the University of Cambridge and will not give a copy to the prison service or NOMS. You will not be identifiable from the transcript. However, we have to make clear that it is a condition of NOMS in allowing us to carry out this research that if we learn of illegal acts or that you are in danger of self-harm, we are obliged to bring this to the attention of the prison authorities.

Thank you for your support!
Yours sincerely
Nicola Padfield

.............................................................................................

Accountability

Prisoners and the families have been reporting the problems since the IPP was introduced this continued with protest letters to MP church leading and family attending parliament and at a later the 2013 research to again highlighted the reality of the problems. 2016 meeting with parole board as a result a massive write in campaign with 38 degrees and inside times began highlighting the same issues. Current 28 June parole board meeting highlight same and this being a snapshot.

Put new wording to a page but its still the same page

Why the ministers did not act that is what i question? Some believe the estates are covering up a the bigger picture. Then Shifting justice ministers, so what’s happened to the data of complaints ?

Who should step in?

Now the parole talk of more delays with no set date to deal with the issues? I know question is there set months or years for the current pilot programmes?

We must argue and demand a policy change for IPPs prisoners, said timely manner!!! Not next year not the year or the year after that ….

I question why is there no accountability?

New wording to a frame but the same frame

Why the government did not act then I have always questioned? Some believe they are covering a bigger picture. Then we had the Shifting justice ministers but what’s happened to the data and what happen to our complaints, did this go with them?

The media has been reporting the problems with IPP moreover the deaths up to 2018 along with the drug issues decades however it got worse?

Accountable who should step in?

Now the parole talk of more delays, how many decades and ministers with no set date to deal with the issues? Since the implementation IPP Sentence they have said we are improving but after every minister it got worse!

I know question is there set months or years for the current pilot programmes?

We must argue and demand a policy change for IPPs prisoners in a timely manner!!! Not next year not the year or the year after that after and so….

I would like to thank Nicola Padfield for her research, now we can look back to see what they did not address thought they was aware.

Now we are in 2018

prisons are the worst ever and its unclear how inmates’ mental health can be improved when the aims for any improvements are never ending.

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Prison reform impossible until jails become safer

Uncategorized / 18th July 2017 18th July 2017 / 5 minutes of reading / HMI Prisons, Peter Clarke, prison safety

Chief Inspector highlights prison safety in annual report

Prison reform will not succeed unless the violence and prevalence of drugs in jail are addressed and prisoners are unlocked for more of the working day.

That is the main conclusion of the Chief Inspector of Prisons, Peter Clarke as he published his annual report today (18 July 2017) based on 86 individual inspection reports on prisons, police custody suites, immigration removal centres and other custodial establishments.

Ministry of Justice (MoJ) data showed that:

in the 12 months to December 2016, there were more than 26,000 assaults, an increase of 27%;
during the same period, assaults on staff rose by 38% to 6,844 incidents;
of these assaults on staff, 789 were serious, an increase of 26%; and
the number of self-inflicted deaths has more than doubled since 2013 and in the 12 months to March 2017, 113 prisoners took their own lives.

Three quarters of inspected prisons sub-standard

Of the 29 local and training prisons inspected during the year, inspectors judged 21 of them to be ‘poor’ or ‘not sufficiently good’ in the area of safety.

Peter Clarke said:

Why have so many of our jails become unsafe? Many of the reasons have been well documented. The prevalence of drugs inside prisons and the seeming inability to keep them out has been a major factor. Debt, bullying and self-segregation by prisoners looking to escape the violence generated by the drugs trade are commonplace. This has all been compounded by staffing levels in many jails that are simply too low to keep order and run a decent regime that allows prisoners to be let out of their cells to get to training and education and have access to basic facilities.
What is it like for prisoners on a day-to-day basis? I have often been appalled by the conditions in which we hold many prisoners. Far too often I have seen men sharing a cell in which they are locked up for as much as 23 hours a day, in which they are required to eat all their meals, and in which there is an unscreened lavatory. On several occasions prisoners have pointed out insect and vermin infestations to me. In many prisons I have seen shower and lavatory facilities that are filthy and dilapidated but with no credible or affordable plans for refurbishment. I have seen many prisoners who are obviously under the influence of drugs.

Particular concerns for young people and children

Some of the most concerning findings during the year came from inspections of the custodial estate for children and young people. In the light of revelations last year about apparent mistreatment of children at Medway Secure Training Centre (STC), the Inspectorate maintained the momentum of inspections at STCs and young offender institutions (YOIs). At that time there were around 609 children held in YOIs and 155 in STCs.

Youth Justice Board Annual Statistics for 2015-16 showed self-harm rates at 8.9 incidents per 100 children compared with 4.1 in 2011;
assault rates were 18.9 per 100 children compared with 9.7 in 2011;
HMI Prisons’ own surveys showed that 46% of boys felt unsafe at their establishment; and
the proportion of boys engaged in a job (16%), vocational training (11%) and offending behaviour programmes (16%) across the YOIs was lower in 2015-16 than at any point since 2010-11.

Peter Clarke said:

In early 2017 I felt compelled to bring to the attention of ministers my serious concern about our findings in the youth estate. By February 2017, we concluded that there was not a single establishment that we inspected in England and Wales in which it was safe to hold children and young people.
The speed of decline has been staggering. In 2013-14 we found that nine out of 12 institutions were graded as good or reasonably good for safety. The reasons for this slump in standards are no doubt complex, but need to be understood and addressed as a matter of urgency.
There seems to be something of a vicious circle. Violence leads to a restrictive regime and security measures which in turn frustrate those being held there. We have seen regimes were boys take every meal alone in their cell, where they are locked up for excessive amounts of time, where they do not get enough exercise, education or training, and where there do not appear to be any credible plans to break the cycle of violence.

Other findings

Other key findings from the report include:

outcomes for prisoners in the five women’s prisons inspected in 2016-17 were better, with strong outcomes for safety, respect and resettlement, although the incidence of self-inflicted death and self-harm among women has risen dramatically;
new psychoactive substances were beginning to have an impact within immigration detention as well as the custodial estate;
there had been some improvements in the Rule 35 process, designed to protect those with serious health problems or who had been victims of torture;
despite police custody being considerably professionalised in recent years, there needs to be a continuing focus on safety, with still too many deficiencies in the governance of the use of force.

Conclusion

Inspectors found – for the first time – that the number of recommendations that had been fully achieved was lower than the number not achieved.
The Chief Inspector expressed his dismay in strong terms:
In many cases the response to previous recommendations has been unforgivably poor.
Given the predictably shocking findings of this annual report, it is perhaps no wonder that the government has abandoned the Prisons and Courts Bill which would have given prison inspectors new powers and required the Justice Secretary to respond to an “urgent notification” of concerns about a particular prison within 28 days setting out:the actions that the Secretary of State has taken, or proposes to take, in response to the concerns described in the notification.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2201039

http://www.russellwebster.com/hmiprison2017/

IPP Prisoners Familys Campaign

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